

U.S.I. JOURNAL

INDIA'S OLDEST JOURNAL ON DEFENCE AFFAIRS

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PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

- | | |
|---|--|
| The Wind of Change | <i>Major K. Brahma Singh</i> |
| Commando Operations Across
The Suez Canal | <i>Edgar O'Ballance</i> |
| Soviet-Pakistani Relations
Since 1950 | <i>M.S. Dahiya</i> |
| Decision Making | <i>Lieut Col. S.C. Sirdeshpande,
VSM</i> |
| How to Enhance the Career
Prospects of the Average
Army Officer | <i>Lieut Col. R.V. Namjoshi</i> |
| The Military Impact of Satellite
Communications | <i>Lieut Col. A.K. Minocha</i> |
| Weapons of War in Ancient India | <i>Gp. Capt. N.N. Dhir,
VSM</i> |

OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1972

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The
JOURNAL
of the
United Service Institution
of
India

(Published by Authority of the Council)



Established : 1870

Postal Address :
KASHMIR HOUSE, KING GEORGE'S AVENUE, NEW DELHI-11
Telephone No : 375828

Vol. CII

OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1972

No. 429

USI Journal is published quarterly in April, July, October and January.
Subscription: Rs. 20 per annum. Single Copy: Rs. 5. Foreign (Sea Mail) \$ 2.00 or Sh 12.50. Subscription should be sent to the Secretary.
It is supplied free to members of the Institution. Articles, Correspondence and Books for Review should be sent to the Editor. Advertisement enquiries concerning space should be sent to the Secretary.

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CONTENTS

OCTOBER - DECEMBER 1972

THE WIND OF CHANGE	Major K. Brahma Singh	317
COMMANDO OPERATIONS ACROSS THE SUEZ CANAL	Edgar O'Ballance	324
SOVIET-PAKISTANI RELATIONS SINCE 1950	M.S. Dahiya	333
DECISION MAKING	Lieut Colonel S.C. Sirdeshpande, VSM	349
HOW TO ENHANCE THE CAREER PROSPECTS OF THE AVERAGE ARMY OFFICER	Lieut. Colonel R.V. Namjoshi	361
THE MILITARY IMPACT OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS	Lieut. Colonel A.K. Minocha	365
WEAPONS OF WAR IN ANCIENT INDIA	Group Captain N.N. Dhir, VSM	369
PAKISTAN FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS: A REVIEW ARTICLE	B.L. Sharma	377
GOOD READING FOR HIGH MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM: A REVIEW ARTICLE	Brigadier J. Nazareth	383
BOOK REVIEW		388
<p>THE YOUNG STALIN (<i>Edward Elis Smith</i>); APPEARANCE AND REALITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (<i>Grant Hugo</i>); THE NATION KILLERS (<i>Robert Conquest</i>); THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND FOREIGN POLICY 1898- 1914 (<i>Zara S. Steiner</i>) ALLIANCES AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (<i>Robert E. Osgood</i>); THE THEORY OF FORCE AND ORGANISATION OF DEFENCE IN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY : FROM EARLIEST TIMES TO 1947 (<i>Nagendra Singh</i>), WAR AND PEACE IN SOUTH EAST ASIA (<i>Peter Lyen</i>); NEPAL STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL (<i>Leo E. Rose</i>); SOUTHEAST ASIA TODAY AND TOMORROW (<i>Richard Butwell</i>); AM- BASSADOR'S JOURNAL (<i>John Kenneth Galbraith</i>); INDIA'S STATIC POWER STRUCTURE (<i>J.D. Sethi</i>); THEIR FINEST HOUR: SAGA OF INDIA'S DECEMBER VICTORY (<i>G.S. Bhargava</i>); 1971 WAR IN PICTURES (<i>Ministry of Information and Broadcasting</i>); HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR (<i>B.H. Liddell Hart</i>); PERCIVAL AND THE TRAGEDY OF SINGAPORE (<i>John Smyth</i>); THE BATTLE FOR GERMANY (<i>H. Essame</i>); THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS (<i>James A. Donovan</i>); THE DEFENDERS: A HISTORY OF THE BRITISH VOLUNTEER (<i>Geoffrey Cousins</i>); THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY HISTORY (<i>R.E. Dupuy and T.N. Dupuy</i>); STORY OF THE OLYMPICS (<i>Melville deMellow</i>).</p>		
SECRETARY'S NOTES		407
ADDITIONS TO THE USI LIBRARY		408

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THE WIND OF CHANGE

MAJOR K. BRAHMA SINGH

TWO hundred years of colonial rule ended in India 25 years ago, bringing in its wake the start of a great social revolution. The revolution may have so far achieved little by way of actually bringing about social equality and ensuring justice, but it certainly has created an awakening among the masses. The masses today are articulate and have begun to demand a say in all matters concerning the nation.

Although the Indian Army (the major component of the armed forces in India) is strictly speaking not totally mass-based, since entry is restricted (voluntarily) to certain sections of the masses, the Indian armed forces in general may be termed as mass-based. The Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy draw for their manpower on all sections of the masses. The impact of the socio-economic change is, therefore, maximum on these two Services. In the case of the Army, martial heredity, tradition, illiteracy and poverty of sections of the masses on which the army draws for its manpower, have somewhat diminished the impact of the change. There has, however, been a change all the same; appreciable enough to be reckoned with.

Change is a law of nature and, therefore, should be as a matter of rule healthy. However any sudden change which goes against the nature of things may not always be for the good. The change in India has been sudden and consequently not exactly ideal. The masses have certainly been awakened to assert their rights and privileges but few understand their responsibilities. This is the only sad aspect of the socio-economic revolution.

Now, how does this change affect the armed forces? The armed forces have of necessity to be run in an authoritarian manner to sustain discipline and to facilitate smooth functioning. For this officers at various levels are vested with summary powers which go against democratic norms. The reasons why the soldier is denied his democratic rights are as under:—

- (a) Military tasks are tasks of great importance which may involve questions of life and death not only of individuals but of the entire nation. Orders are, therefore, required to be obeyed, promptly, unfalteringly, and implicitly. This leaves little scope for indulging in democratic graces like debate, argument or questioning of proprieties of orders; either because there may not be enough time for explanations or the lower echelons may not be knowledgeable enough to grasp the significance of the higher aim.

- (b) Needs of discipline can only be met when the defaulter is brought to book with speed and is not permitted to wriggle out of the clutches of law either by creating a fog of doubt or by haggling through interpretations of law.
- (c) Security of information, an aspect vital for the survival of the soldier, demands that the freedom of expression of a soldier, who may well become the source of leakage, is curbed.

However strong the wind of change may blow over the rest of the country, the soldier cannot expect to enjoy the freedom that his civilian counterpart enjoys. No wonder that our democratic government has done nothing to disturb the old law and traditions in the armed forces. So those in command of troops who feel that democracy has adversely affected the discipline in the armed forces have nobody but themselves to blame.

This does not, however, make the armed forces totally authoritarian. An element of democracy should always be there. Although the armed forces function machine-like, they comprise humans who have a mind besides the body. Within limits the questioning mind has to be satiated to get the best from the body. This aspect was perhaps ignored (or was it avoided?) in the past. It was then considered blasphemous to question 'why', however stupid the orders. The present-day Jawan wants to know 'why' both regards the higher policy and the lower implementation. The British did not want the Jawans to know the 'why' to prevent them from seeing through their aims which went against the interests of our country. So they never got him into the habit of questioning anything. But today by knowing the 'why' the Jawan may feel better motivated. There is really nothing new in the concept of officers taking the men into confidence. General Sovorov had laid it down in his famous doctrine years back in the following words:

"Every private soldier has a share in the commanders plan and must understand it—ultimately he and his commander are one".

All this has, of course, to be within limits. Too much reasoning may create more doubts than remove them. Another way of satisfying a questioning mind would be for the leader to win over the faith of the men to such an extent that they have no need to question.

EFFECTS ON LEADERSHIP

Tradition and discipline are today fighting hard to keep any change away from the armed forces. Still much change has seeped through. This is by and large considered harmful by most members of the armed forces; especially the older lot who have never-ending tales of the British era to tell. They speak longingly of the days when there was no questioning, no arguments and there were such wonderful things as "a young officer being

seen and not heard"; when the troops were dumb mute animals who willingly allowed themselves to be driven. All this had made leadership very simple; and fascinating too with plenty of time for the officer to play golf and indulge in other social activity. These officers are naturally sore about the changed times which demand much more from them as leaders than they were accustomed to give in the past.

A CHALLENGE

The changed times of today have indeed posed a great challenge to leadership at all levels of command. Leadership can no longer be taken for granted by mere virtue of rank and appointment. It entails influencing those under command by combined effects of the force of personality, reason, persuasion and personal example of the leader rather than the use of authority. Every leader has to work for it. The leader must accept the challenge and live upto the changed times rather than sulk over it. Any sagging of discipline in troops, if there is at all, is the result of bad leadership rather than the effect of the wind of change. Some of the aspects of leadership and officer-men relationship that require re-thinking under the present context are as follows:—

- (a) Loyalty
- (b) Social equality
- (c) Maintaining distance
- (d) Rights and privileges
- (e) Sense of responsibility
- (f) A spartan outlook

Loyalty: Strictly speaking it would not be correct to say that there has been a change in the concept of loyalty as such. It would be more appropriate to say that instead of denoting a slave mentality, loyalty today is taking the dignified form of subordinating all other loyalties to the one for the country, the armed forces and to one's duty. In the process loyalty to one's superiors becomes necessary but the difference lies in where the emphasis is laid. How the loyalty for one's superiors should be subordinated to the loyalty to one's duty is illustrated by the following quotation from Lt.-Gen. Tukker:

"It will be nearer truth to say that only he can command who has the courage and initiative to disobey..... Into the word self-control must be read the knowledge of his profession which enables him to disobey with a certainty that disobedience is not merely for the sake of itself or to further his own ambition but for good of all". (Approach to Battle by Lt-Gen Tukker)

The loyalty of the subordinate for his superior cannot therefore be taken for granted. The superior officer must earn it through sincerity,

affection and, above all, reciprocal loyalty towards his men. For loyalty begets loyalty.

Social equality: There is no denying the fact that the nation is today moving slowly but steadily towards a classless society aiming at social equality. What is pertinent for the armed forces is that the men no longer fear the officer in the way they used to. They are more free with the officer and speak out their minds more freely. This has given a new dimension to leadership in the armed forces.

Apart from the general wind of change blowing in social equality, it is also now not necessary for the officer to belong to the class of people that was in the past considered the higher strata of society; the affluent class who believed leadership to be their birth-right. People from this class, in fact, automatically became leaders and were accepted by the men as such. With the commission prospects now open to all and sundry, a large number of officers today come from the same social strata as the men they command. The modern leader has therefore to rise against the backdrop of feelings of those of his men who are as much educated as he is, and believe that with a little more luck they too could have been officers. Such leaders have neither the white skin nor the strength of a higher social background to be accepted as leaders automatically by their men. Getting commission in the armed forces does not now appear difficult and it no longer evokes admiration of others. To win the admiration and respect of his men, the officer has to possess the true qualities of a leader such as self-sacrifice, self-discipline and professional efficiency. There are no more any short-cuts to leadership.

Maintaining distance: The old-time officer was very particular about maintaining a distance from his men. Times have changed and there is no place for such an attitude today. Apart from the general trend towards social equality the correct form of leadership expects the leader to be a de facto friend, philosopher and guide of his men. He must, therefore, mix freely with the men and encourage them to speak out their minds and be able to answer their questions.

Rights and privileges: The soldier has started asserting his rights. There are signs that he has even begun to challenge the privileges of the officer. On the face of it this is a healthy change. After all, why should the men not get their rights and why should an officer enjoy privileges which the soldier is not entitled to? The basis of good discipline is justice; and justice demands that the men must be given their rights. They must be given their dues not as a matter of right but as a matter of an officer's duty. Giving the men their rights in no way prevents the officer from ensuring that they perform their duties.

There is no reason why the men should grudge the officer's privileges.

Even in communist countries officers enjoy privileges which the men don't. The officer has to be given privileges for a number of reasons. There are privileges that go with his rank and appointment for improved efficiency. There are others that help him to maintain his dignity in keeping with his status and there are some privileges that are necessary for motivating the best among the youth to join the armed forces. But justice demands that privileges are real privileges and not forcibly coined by the officer for self advantage just because he is in a position to do so by virtue of his authority. The men would be quite justified in challenging such self created privileges.

Sense of responsibility: One redeeming factor about the change that has come about is the increased sense of responsibility among all ranks. This change is, however, not always fully exploited. The sense of responsibility of juniors is often marred by the senior constantly curbing the juniors' enthusiasm, initiative, drive and originality under the fear of making mistakes and having to take the rap for it. Repeatedly doubting the subordinate's sense of responsibility starts a vicious circle in which the senior's distrust of the junior makes the junior less responsible; forcing the senior to distrust him more. This equally applies to officer-man relationship. The men today do not have to be driven as in the past. The soldier has a "share in the commander's plan and must understand it. Ultimately he and his commander are one". (Sovorov doctrine).

Spartan outlook: Sovorov has said that "hard living and a spartan outlook make good soldiers". However, spartan living and spartan outlook become difficult with rising economic prosperity. That is probably why Napoleon said that "poverty, privation and want are the greatest schools of soldiering". Although we are yet far from that stage of economic prosperity when it would be difficult to get good soldiers, the problem has already started raising its head. The present-day soldier has become soft like his civilian counterpart, who is leading a more comfortable life. Comfort is a relative term, and one is comfortable or uncomfortable according to what standard of comfort one lays down for oneself. The lower the standard of comfort the more comfortable one would always be. This is the basis on which spartan life is advocated for the soldier; not to make him uncomfortable but to make him feel comfortable even in adverse conditions.

Whatever views one may have on comfort, there can be no difference of opinion as regards the effects of fashion on the armed forces. Nobody minds a soldier trying to look smart provided he does not lose his manliness in doing so. The current hippy trend among the youth of the country is beginning to show itself in the armed forces also. Girlish hair styles with locks of hair delicately positioned on the forehead, though only practiced by a small minority in the armed forces, are egregiously visible. This is the most unhealthy trend and must be nipped in the bud by the officer.

MOTIVATION

In the past, belonging to a particular community was a sufficient motive for the soldier to fight and give his all. To motivate him further he was given preferential treatment and a high status in society. The former has changed little but the latter very much, notwithstanding the ovation that the soldier is wont to get during actual war or even perhaps a little after the cease-fire. Employment in armed forces is not governed by the normal demand and supply rule of economics for determining their pay and motivation. Pay may motivate a soldier to join the armed forces but it cannot motivate him much to fight. Why would then a guerilla fight when he gets little or no pay? Even the fact that there is no dearth of recruits for the armed forces is no indication that our soldier is rightly motivated to join the armed forces; not with such acute unemployment in the country.

With the present trend of decrying martial races and the martial races themselves gradually realising that other jobs are more profitable than service in the armed forces, the only motive of heredity and prestige urging the soldier to join the armed forces is fast losing appeal. There is therefore an urgent need to motivate the soldier in ways other than those losing appeal with the change of time.

The strongest motive that could prompt the soldier to fight is his sense of patriotism and nationalism. There can indeed be little doubt regarding that, but it would be wrong to think that nationalism among the soldiers can be taken for granted. The present-day soldier has a questioning mind and wants to be convinced before accepting anything. He must, therefore, be trained mentally to stand up to anti-national forces. He has, in other words, to be politically motivated. He must know what he is fighting for and then only will he fight with vehemence. The onus for motivating the men lies on the officer class.

Even when politically motivated the soldier will need other motivations to make him sacrifice his life for the nation. He will need to be assured:

- (a) a reasonable standard of living;
- (b) that his position of being chained in discipline is not exploited by anyone;
- (c) that his profession is treated with respect;
- (d) that while he is sacrificing for his country those behind him are also doing their bit; and
- (e) that there is somebody to look after his family while he is fighting on the front.

The onus for providing these motivating assurances lies on society and the nation.

CONCLUSION

The socio-economic change that has come about in the nation was inevitable with the coming of freedom. It is a change that behoves a free nation. However the change has been sudden and therefore not without its drawbacks; the biggest being that, whereas in a free nation rights and responsibilities go side by side, in our country the awareness of the nation to responsibilities is not keeping pace with the spread of awareness of rights.

Tradition and discipline have fought hard to keep the change away from the armed forces but even then much change has seeped in; which was but natural. There is nothing to worry about this change as far as discipline in the armed forces is concerned. It cannot effect the discipline of our armed forces any more than it has in other free countries of the world. It has however added a new dimension to leadership and officer-man relationship. The officer can no longer take his leadership for granted by virtue of his rank and appointment. He has now to earn it by displaying the true qualities of a leader. He must keep pace with the times but ensure that he does not run ahead of it. It is as bad to run ahead of time as it is to lag behind it.

One alarming aspect of this change seems to be the weakening of the motivating factors. It is very surprising that motivation in the armed forces should have diminished after independence. The British needed the armed forces to preserve imperialism. The free nation needs them today to preserve freedom. Nationalism and patriotism which should serve as a good motivation for the soldier to fight cannot be totally taken for granted. Nationalism today does not have the same simple meaning as given in our religion. The complete meaning has today been confused by numerous political terms like neo-colonialism, internationalism, reactionaries, revisionists.

In the armed forces, the soldier needs to be politically educated to know what he is fighting for. Above all he must get his biggest motivation from the nation in that his profession must be treated as the noblest of all.

COMMANDO OPERATIONS ACROSS THE SUEZ CANAL

EDGAR O'BALLANCE

IN the prelude to, and during, the war of attrition, which altogether lasted from June 1967 to August 1970, both the Egyptians and the Israelis carried out commando-type operations and raids across the Suez Canal, circumstances and capabilities compelling them to modify and adapt their aims and objectives, so that each developed a different kind of technique. The Suez Canal proved to be a huge, impassable anti-tank ditch, which kept two hostile armies apart and prevented any large-scale movement of land forces, other than a mass amphibious assault. This impasse produced side-effects in the form of commando raids across this barrier.

Since Independence, the Egyptians raised a handful of small commando units although, as was the current military fashion in those days, soldiers with a taste for the offensive volunteered for the paratroop formations. Eventually Egypt had about 15 commando units, each of about 120 men and, influenced by boasts of the Fedayeen, they were trained to raid enemy territory to carry out acts of sabotage and terrorism. On the eve of the Six-Day War, two of these units were flown into Jordan and, as hostilities broke out, were sent into the central part of Israel, their tasks being to sabotage airfields and lay mines. They had much more success than the Israelis would admit, killing and wounding several people, ambushing vehicles and generally causing alarm: units had to be diverted to round them up. The Israelis remain silent about their exploits, but as far as can be ascertained, out of some 240 Egyptian commandos who penetrated Israel, about 40 were killed and 40 captured, while the remainder managed to make their way back to Arab territory. Owing to the rapidity of the Israeli advances, other Egyptian commando units did not have the opportunity of proving their capability.

The Israelis did not have special units for commando raiding, the best of their soldiers usually gravitating into the paratroop formations, which held pride of place, having gained a high reputation in the Sinai Campaign of 1956. Israeli border reprisal raids were carried out by conventional regular units, the larger ones comprising elements of all arms. An exception was the small naval commando unit, as yet unblooded, trained to raid from the sea, which bored with inactivity had hitch-hiked to the Golan Heights, only to arrive there as the war ended.

PRELUDE TO WAR

During the Six-Day War the Egyptian air force had been almost completely destroyed and its land forces driven from the Sinai Peninsula, the exhausted Israelis halting on the east bank of the Suez Canal. Hostilities with the Israelis had died down on 8th June 1967, but the ensuing dull pause did not last long and on 1st July an Egyptian commando unit, of about 100 men in two boats, crossed the Canal about 10 miles south of Port Said, and clashed with an Israeli patrol. On the 3rd, the Israelis admitted the first Egyptian act of sabotage in the Sinai, when a train was derailed just to the west of Romani, and on the 12th the first exchange of artillery fire cross the Canal occurred. The prelude to war had begun.

The Egyptian forces in the Sinai had lost practically all their guns, vehicles and equipment, but by mid-October, about 60% had been replaced by the Soviet Union, anxious in case the Israelis, when they recovered their breath, would try to cross the Canal and advance towards Cairo. In November, President Nasser made his first tough speech since defeat: the Egyptians were recovering confidence. By January 1968, more Soviet military material had been received, but the accent then was on defensive weapons, especially guns, the object being to make the Egyptians strong enough to oppose any attempted Israeli crossing. Additionally, there were an estimated 2,000 Soviet personnel in Egypt helping to re-build the forces. Even had Egyptian spirit, morale and capability been up to it, the Soviet Union had no intention of allowing the Egyptians to attempt to regain the Sinai by force, and thus start the fourth Arab-Israeli war.

Several small Egyptian commando raids were made across the Canal in this period, some for information and some for purposes of terrorism, but the Egyptian commandos were only a pale copy of their Fatah counterparts. The Egyptian raids were neither bold nor sustained, and although a few Israelis were wounded, none was killed. The Israelis gave these activities no publicity. The Soviet advisers, having no guerrilla tradition themselves, and thining always in "big battalions", gave no encouragement, but despite this lack of support the nucleus of Egyptian commandos remained alive, even if not all that active.

ISRAELI RAIDS

The Israelis still held undisputed command of the skies in this part of West Asia, and because they had such overwhelming air superiority, they did not have to go in for petty raids across the Canal, as their intelligence system brought in sufficient information about the defences on the west bank, while their aircraft were used both for reconnaissance and reprisal. At this stage the Israelis merely lightly held the east bank with small observation posts and patrols, relying upon the mobility of forces lying

back to repel any Egyptian attacks. So it was not all that hard for small parties of commandos to slip across the Canal during darkness, lay a few mines on tracks, or set up an ambush, and quickly return.

As they arrived, Soviet-supplied guns were massed close to the Canal on the west bank and in October 1968 the Egyptians unleashed a heavy artillery barrage against the Israelis on the opposite bank who, having no bomb-proof shelters or deep cover, in a single night lost 15 soldiers killed. The response was the first Israeli heli-borne commando reprisal raid on the bridge, dam and power station at Nag Hamadi, on the River Nile, some 140 miles inside Egypt, when over \$ 15-million of damage was caused. This led the Egyptians into almost silencing their guns for nearly five months.

Israel had just over 50 helicopters, that included 12 Super Frelons, able to carry 30 combat troops, eight US CH-53As, able to transport 38 soldiers, and some 25 AB-205s, which also had a good troop-carrying capacity. By comparison the Egyptian commando effort was puny and ineffective—it was the growing numbers of Egyptian guns that caused concern and casualties, and while still relying upon air power as the main reprisal weapon, the Israelis had looked for and found an additional method with which to strike at the Egyptians well in the rear.

WAR OF ATTRITION

The lull lasted until March 1969, when President Nasser's "War of Attrition" can be said to have started, during which time both sides looked for other military options to break the stalemate and neutralise the other's deadliest weapons. The Egyptian forces were re-equipped, strengthened and trained, and more guns were moved to the edge of the Canal, until they numbered nearly 1,000, while the Israelis concentrated upon completing a string of fortifications and deep shelters along the opposite bank, which became known as the Bar Lev Line, after the Israeli Chief of Staff.

On 21st March, the Egyptians opened up with a heavy barrage that lasted intermittently for four days, in which they fired an estimated 40,000 shells. Israeli casualties were minimised as the Bar Lev Line had just been completed. After this the Egyptian guns were seldom silent for long, and artillery duels—the Israelis now having some 300 guns near the Canal —being increasingly frequent. The Israeli reply was heavy air assaults on the Egyptian guns and installations—but still the guns fired on. Foreign observers remarked on the improvement in Egyptian gunnery.

During the spring and summer small Egyptian commando raids across the Canal continued, many not being admitted by the Israelis. For example, on the night of 22nd April, three Israeli soldiers were killed and another kidnapped, on 21st June, the Israelis admitted two Egyptian raids in one night in the Bitter Lake area, and on 5th July, five Israelis were killed when

their truck struck a mine. Egyptian mine-laying activities clearly worried the Israelis, as they made tracks and routes dangerous, and accordingly hampered patrolling and supply to forward positions.

ISRAELI COMMANDO RAIDS

In July 1969, in an attempt to silence the Egyptian guns that almost continually thundered across the Canal, the Israelis adopted a new policy of hitting deeper into Egypt from the air, as well as pounding the gun positions, which Moshe Dayan, the Defence Minister, called a "limited offensive", and which was to be supported by commando raids on the flanks and into the hinterland. The first of these raids occurred on the night of July 20, when about 50 Israeli paratroops, in three helicopters, covered by aircraft overhead and assisted by MTBs, raided Green Island, an artificial anti-aircraft platform near the southern entrance to the Suez Canal, manned by just under 100 Egyptian soldiers, on which were anti-aircraft guns and radar equipment. At the best it was a drawn battle, the Israelis claiming they killed 25 Egyptians for the loss of only six Israelis killed, and nine wounded, while the Egyptians claimed the boarding attempt failed, and the Israelis lost 30 killed and that one Mirage plane was brought down for the cost of only six Egyptian dead and wounded. As a matter of interest, four Egyptian officers were later court-martialled for their part in this action, and sentenced to death (it is not known whether their sentences were ever carried out).

During the third week of August, 11 Israeli soldiers were killed on the Canal Front, mainly by shell fire, and this provoked an Israeli commando raid, on the 27th, by about 70 paratroops, in five helicopters, on the HQ of the Southern Front, near Asyut, on the River Nile, a penetration into Egyptian territory of about 150 miles. Taking it by surprise, the Israelis, used 120mm mortars and then withdrew, claiming they had no losses, while the abashed Egyptians were silent about theirs.

Egyptian guns continued to fire along the Canal, and so on the night of 7th September, Israeli MTBs raided the tiny naval base of Ras El Sadat, about 12 miles from the now deserted town of Suez, and Israeli frogmen destroyed two Egyptian MTBs for no loss to themselves. Still the guns fired on, causing the Israelis to make a raid in force, two days later, when just before dawn, six tanks and three armoured personnel carriers, with about 150 men, were put ashore on the Gulf of Suez near El Khafayer, and began moving southwards along the metalled coast road which was a dual-carriage way. The vehicles were of Soviet origin, captured in the Six-Day War, and the Israelis wore Egyptian uniforms, so they were not suspected as they motored southwards about 40 miles, shooting up vehicles, convoys, guard posts and camps. Twice this force stopped to shoot up and destroy radar installations near the coast. It re-embarked about ten

hours later near Ras Zafarana, claiming to have killed many Egyptians, and only admitting one Israeli soldier wounded, and one plane brought down by a Hawk missile. There had been heavy Israeli air cover throughout. The Egyptians had been taken completely by surprise, and more doubtfully claimed to have foiled the landing, shot down three Israeli planes, sunk two Israeli launches and inflicted heavy casualties.

The Israelis began to worry about the radar detection system being constructed by the Soviet personnel for the Egyptians, and the modern, advanced equipment that was appearing and continued their occasional commando tactics. On 25th October, a heli-borne commando raid was made on radar installations near Safage, on the Red Sea coast, some 130 miles south of Suez town, and on 18th December, they launched a commando raid in boats by night across the Canal just to the north of Ishmailia to attack some radar positions, which the air force had not been able to obliterate. This devolved into confusion, there being an unstated number of casualties on both sides. On 26th December, a group of paratroops in helicopters raided the Egyptian radar site near Ras Gharib, on the Gulf of Suez, about 60 miles south of Suez town, and succeeded in capturing a Soviet P. 12 radar system, which had a range of about 200 miles, and had been put there to plug a gap in the Egyptian radar screen. The paratroops had made a 90-minute forced march over the desert to take the Egyptians by surprise, and once the position had fallen, helicopters flew in, and took back the radar equipment, weighing some seven tons and the commandos. This was the first of its type to be seen by foreigners, and the news was triumphantly released on 1st January 1970, by which time the Soviet radar had been secretly returned, the Israelis on second thoughts being apprehensive as to how the Soviet Union might react to such audacity, but it was a raid that caught the world's imagination for its daring and initiative.

DUAL ROLES

Meanwhile the Egyptian commandos had been increased to 20 units, and in the summer of 1969, in addition to their existing role they were additionally given that of being in, or ahead of, the leading wave in a major assault crossing-of the Canal, to breach the outer defences and remove mines. The Soviet Military Mission approved of this amphibious assault task, supplied boats and gave appropriate training, a number of units being sent to Fayoum, to the west of the River Nile, near where there was a huge lake suitable for the purpose. They were later joined by other conventional units of the Egyptian army, and eventually in the following summer (of 1970) were training with whole divisions, one at a time. The first conventional assault action, by a unit of about 90 men, in nine boats, was made on 3rd October 1969, being launched at night after a heavy artillery barrage against Israeli positions near Deir Suwar, in the Bitter Lake area. Confused and inconclusive fighting resulted, and neither side issued any casualty figures for some time.

Sabotage and terrorist tactics were not forgotten, and Egyptian commandos still occasionally slipped across the Canal to plant mines and lay ambushes. In November, for example, Egyptian commandos crossed the Canal about six miles north of Tewfik to ambush an Israeli patrol, killing two and capturing one soldier. That night an Egyptian commando party crossed near El Shatt to attack Israeli vehicles, when one Israeli was killed and another captured. On the 6th, yet another Egyptian commando group raided over the Canal to ambush an Israeli patrol in the El Kaff sector, wounding five Israelis. This flurry of Egyptian raids caused Dayan, the Defence Minister, to admit that a military reply was still being worked out, and for General Fawzi, the Egyptian Defence Minister, to boast that the Egyptian soldier "had great fighting efficiency".

TURN OF THE WAR

The receipt of US Phantoms in the latter part of 1969 by the Israelis enabled them to progressively strike farther into Egypt, and in the first three months of 1970 Israeli aircraft reached the outskirts of Cairo and the Nile Valley. In response to alarmed Egyptian requests, the Russians provided numbers of their improved SAM-2s, which began to arrive in March, and also their SAM-3s the latter being manned entirely by Soviet personnel. The following month Soviet pilots began to patrol over Egypt, thus denying the freedom of those skies to the Israelis, who dare not risk a clash with Soviet-piloted aircraft for fear of Soviet reaction. This proved to be the vital turning point of the war of Attrition, and the last deep-penetration raid over Egypt was carried out by the Israelis on 13th April, after which the offensive range of Israeli aircraft was considerably shortened.

This also meant that the scope for Israeli heli-borne raids was curtailed, and only one more of any note was made, on 23rd June, when about 70 paratroops in helicopters made a raid on Bir Araida, near the Soviet-controlled air base of Beni Suef, near the River Nile, about 50 miles south of Cairo. Only sparse details are available, but the Israelis did not seem to be able to achieve their objective, which presumably was to destroy the radar station.

Like the Egyptians, the Israelis had a re-think about their commando concept, and trained some of their units in assault crossing of water obstacles. On 14th March, Israeli units made a frontal assault across the Canal, about 20 miles south of Port Said, losing two killed and four wounded, claiming that this proved they had the capability to establish a bridgehead on the Egyptian side. The Egyptians claimed the landing was foiled by Egyptian gunners, who sank several boats and so prevented it from being a success. It was almost three months before the Israelis tried this type of operation again, when on 12th June, just after 120 Egyptian commandos had killed 13 Israeli soldiers in two ambushes, another group of Israeli units crossed the Canal just to the north of Kantara, and blew up a two-mile stretch of fortifications that had been under heavy air assault for a fortnight. The Israelis

claimed to have killed 50 Egyptians, for the loss of four dead and 15 wounded. The Egyptians made contrary claims.

Egyptian commandos for their part still occasionally slipped across to the Israeli side to lay mines and set ambushes, and for example, on 26th March, a party of them ambushed an Israeli convoy near Deir Suwar, killing one and wounding three others. On 14th May, Egyptian naval frogmen daringly penetrated Eilat harbour to sink an Israeli trawler, but the main emphasis was now on their amphibious role. On 30th May, two commando units made the first really successful attack across the Canal in the northern sector, when they assaulted an Israeli armoured unit, killing 14, wounding two and capturing another two, as well as destroying several armoured vehicles. This particular assault was carried out in two waves, which caused the Egyptians to claim that two separate commando raids had been made in the same evening.

The sudden shooting down of two Israeli aircraft on 30th June, marked an adverse turn in the air war for the Israelis. The appearance close to the Canal of new SAM-2s, with improved radar guidance and electronic aids brought parity to the opposing air forces. Until this moment the Israelis had superiority, but after it they lost roughly the same number of aircraft as the Egyptians, just under a dozen, as opposed to the previous ratio of 1:10. Israeli aircraft were now virtually restricted to the narrow Canal zone, and for the remaining six weeks of the war of Attrition, until the cease-fire came into effect on 7th August 1970, neither side launched any more commando raids of any type of any note.

OBSERVATIONS

President Nasser's War of Attrition gave us the opportunity to evaluate commando activities against the background of what was really a mini-conventional static war, and we saw that the Egyptians, mainly because for most of the time they had no adequate air cover, but partly because they were influenced by the Fedayeen mystique, restricting their commando activities to small, silent night sorties whereas, having complete command of the air for most of the time, the Israelis were able to disdainfully disregard such tactics as they could attack Egyptian territory from the air whenever they liked. It was only later when air power could not keep the Egyptian guns silent, when looking for further options the Israelis decided to try out the commando one, and so paratroops were packed into helicopters and sent on raids. Both the Egyptians and the Israelis changed their concept of the commando role from that of simply raiding enemy territory, to that of being in, or even going before, the shock wave of an amphibious assault. The Egyptians were encouraged in this by the Soviet Military Mission, which disliked Feydayeen methods, while gradual loss of air superiority forced the Israelis to abandon heli-borne raids, and to demonstrate that they had an amphibious capability too.

Another point of interest was that the Egyptians thought it necessary to have special commando units, while the Israelis did not. This was mainly due to the Arab obsession with the Fedayeen idea, and the scope for it, while the Israelis did not even consider instigating sabotage and terrorism in Arab territory—with their air superiority they did not need to. Ample manpower allowed the Egyptians to maintain about 2,200 commando troops without strain, while shortage of manpower ruled out such luxuries for the Israelis, even if they had been interested in such a project. Both had paratroop formations, and at first the Israelis used paratroops on their raids, for which no extra special training was required, while special selection and training were required for Fedayeen activities. At one stage Israeli paratroops were used almost exclusively in reprisal raids, which caused discontent within the army, which was trying to raise the whole of the infantry up to the standard of the paratroops. So ordinary infantry units were also used at times. In fact, the larger raids were made by composite groups of several arms. Certainly, paratroops had an instant commando capability because of their processes of selection and training, but not every infantryman automatically has this potential, and so in most cases some extra training is necessary.

The results achieved may seem insignificant and were of nuisance value only as none directly influenced the course of the war. But one should remember that the number of troops involved on commando operations was only a tiny proportion of those involved in the war as a whole. The Egyptians were perhaps more successful than the Israelis as their activities caused a small, but steady number of casualties, apprehension, hindrance in the forward areas, and tied down extra troops for security measures against them. The Israeli heli-borne commando raids made encouraging news communiques, but although they seized some radar equipment, they were unable to disrupt the Egyptian radar system which became increasingly efficient. They simply caused the Egyptians to tighten their security. But then neither did the Egyptian commandos disrupt the Bar Lev Line.

No new techniques of war evolved, and the mechanics of the surprise raid, the ambush and mine-laying can be found in any army's instructional manuals, and are all on much the same pattern. One could perhaps discuss academically the merits and demerits of the silent arrival of commandos by foot or boat, as against the noisy appearance by helicopter, or the scope for using captured vehicles and uniforms. Only a few of the raids are mentioned here, mainly for illustrative purposes. There were far more, many of them were not admitted or publicised, some for the converse reasons, because they failed or succeeded, thus lowering or boosting morale—depending from which side of the Canal they were regarded.

As to the future both countries will retain, and even increase, their commando element for the amphibious assault role, to be complementary to a conventional attack across the Suez Canal, and it can be noted that the

Soviet Union has already sent Egypt at least 150 amphibious PT-76s and about 1,000 amphibious armoured personnel carriers, while reports indicate that other equipment, such boats, bridging and pontoons, have arrived. It should be remembered that Egypt has at least 140 helicopters, including some Mi-6s, the largest helicopter flying in the world; so one cannot overlook the possibility that they might, as soon as adequate air cover can be given, take a leaf from the Israeli book, and mount some heli-borne commando raids into Israel or the Israeli occupied territories.

SOVIET-PAKISTANI RELATIONS SINCE 1950

M.S. DAHIYA*

WHEN the Soviet leaders were giving finishing touches to their South Asian policy in the early 50s with regard to the newly independent countries, the so-called cold war had taken a new shape. By the end of November 1953, it had become clear that the Pakistani leaders were inclined to enter into alliances with the Western Powers. In spite of the protests made by the leaders in the Kremlin, Pakistan joined the military alliances in 1954. Thereafter, the Russian leaders adopted a pro-India stand on the Kashmir issue and this culminated in strained relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union. Therefore, it would be desirable to study Soviet-Pakistani relations against the background of such developments.

Just after the partition of India, Pakistan was in search of allies among the Western Powers and Commonwealth countries, but she found that the Labour Government in Britain was not prepared to annoy Mr. Nehru on the Kashmir issue, and the lobbies in the American Congress and President Truman were in favour of cementing their relations with India, in preference to Pakistan. The Soviet Union adopted a wavering attitude towards the subcontinent and considered both India and Pakistan as colonies of Great Britain. A Russian writer said:

The country [Pakistan] has formally received the right of self-government, but, in view of the situation of millions of working people—landless peasants and factory workers—the present regime is semi-colonial, as was its predecessor.¹

Moreover, Leninism, a progressive force, and Pakistan's theocratic concept were not compatible. Despite this the Soviet leaders invited Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, to visit Moscow in 1949. When this news reached Washington, the American Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East and African Affairs visited Pakistan and extended the U.S. Government's invitation to Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan to visit the United States in 1950. The invitation was accepted and the projected visit to the

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1. Mirzo Turshum Zade, "Beyond the Hills of Pakistan", *Current Digest of Soviet Press* (Hereinfter referred to as *C.D.S.P.*) vol. II, No. 6, March 25, 1950, p. 29. (From *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, February 4, 1950).

Soviet Union was dropped.² By the time the Pakistani Prime Minister visited Washington, the situation in Korea had taken a new shape. Since the Pakistani leaders were determined to cement their relations with the United States to secure her support on the Kashmir issue, Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan, on his way back to Karachi from Washington, declared that Pakistan would give every assistance "within its means" in support of Washington's "aggression in Korea".³ The leaders in the Kremlin reacted sharply and left the ambassadorial post vacant in Karachi up to March 15, 1950.⁴ Besides they warned Pakistan:

The assistance Liaqat Ali Khan is capable of rendering the American aggressors in Korea is of course, a negligible quantity. But the Pakistan Premier's readiness to serve American imperialism may have very important and deplorable consequences for Pakistan.⁵

The Soviet Press published many stories with regard to the Pakistani decision to support American action in Korea. *Izvestia* revealed that Mr. Warren, the American Ambassador to Pakistan, had assured Pakistan that "in exchange for participation in the Korean war" she "would receive America's vigorous support on the Kashmir question".⁶ Quoting from *Avanti*, an Italian daily, *Pravda* said that the American State Department "is ready to offer great economic and military assistance" to Pakistan, "if the government is altered to make it more amenable to collaboration with the U.S.A." Under such circumstances, "Washington is even ready to promise the Karachi government" America's "active support on the Kashmir question."⁷

MAIN AIM

The main aim of Pakistan in maintaining good relations with Washington was that it wanted a clear-cut support on the Kashmir issue and economic and military assistance to build itself against India. For the achievement of these aims Pakistan preferred the United States, as the leaders in Pakistan suspected the motives of the Soviet Union. According to a Pakistani Group Study:

Pakistan had noticed the subservience which was forced upon the allies of the Soviet Union and, as we have seen, independence had been won after too profound a struggle for its loss to be risked.

2. "Fundamentals of Pakistan's Foreign Policy" (A Group Study), *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. IX, No. 1, March 1956, p. 46.
3. "Liaqat Ali Khan shows servile Zeal", *New Times*, No. 28, July 12, 1950, p. 19.
4. Vijay Sen Budhraj, "The Evolution of Russia's Pakistan Policy", *The Australian Journal of History and Politics*, vol. XVI, No. 3, December 1970, p. 347.
5. "Liaqat Ali Khan shows servile Zeal", n. 3, p. 20.
6. "Americans Incite Conflict Between India and Pakistan", *C.D.S.P.*, vol. II, No. 32, September 1950, p. 28. (From *Izvestia*, August 9, 1950, p. 4).
7. "Anglo-American Rivalry in Pakistan", *C.D.S.P.*, vol. IX, No. 25, August 2, 1950, pp. 10-11. (From *Pravda*, June 19, 1952, p. 3).

Furthermore, there was the question whether Russia could supply the aid, both material and technical, which Pakistan so urgently required. For these reasons, an alliance between the two countries was, ab initio, impossible.⁸

So far as the American interest was concerned, she wanted to contain communism through the mechanism of military bases around the periphery of the Soviet Union. As the Indian Government was not prepared to abandon the policy of non-alignment in spite of the efforts of Washington, America had to look towards Pakistan. Though the aims of both Washington and Pakistan were clear, the Russian Government continued to make efforts to develop relations with Pakistan. In an article in *Pravda*, a Russian writer observed that "by taking advantage of Pakistan's serious economic plight", the Americans "are trying to impose their dictation on this country", the entire "progressive Pakistani public is opposing" Pakistan's "enslavement by the imperialists" and her "involvement in the Middle East Command."⁹

Though the Soviet Union was trying to the best of her ability to prevent Pakistan from going into the orbit of Washington, rumours had it in the fall of 1953 that Karachi was being entangled into a military alliance with the Western Powers. The Soviet leaders protested against this move. On November 30, 1953, the Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan met the Pakistani Foreign Secretary and expressed Russia's concern over this development.¹⁰ In spite of this, in January 1954, the Soviet Union offered technological assistance to Pakistan. Even after Pakistan had entered into an alliance with the Western Powers in April-May 1954, the Soviet Red Cross Society in September 1954 sent Rs. 50,000 to Pakistan for the flood victims in Pakistan.¹¹ Since the leaders in the Kremlin had thoroughly misunderstood the intention of Pakistan, they still hoped for improvement of their relations with her. *Izvestia* published an article in August 1955 reconsidering Rawalpindi's position in the world and concluding that "she was not yet altogether lost to the imperialists" in spite of her "membership in SEATO and CENTO". Moreover, "in the government itself there were "progressive forces which were struggling" to move the country towards "freedom and true independence". Karachi's "co-sponsorship of the Bandung Conference" indicated that Pakistan wished "to side with the Asians" while her willingness to accept aid from "any quarter proved her unwillingness to be economically tied to anybody".¹² But the relations

8. "The Fundamentals of Pakistan's Foreign Policy", n. 2, p. 46.

9. V. Rusanov, "Pakistan in the Aggressor's Plans", *C.D.S.P.*, vol. V, No. 16, May 30, 1953, p. 13. (From *Pravda* April 7, 1953, p. 4).

10. Devendra Kaushik, *Soviet Union's Relations with India and Pakistan* (Prerna Prakashan, New Delhi), First Edition, 1971, p. 38.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

12. See Werner Levi, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China", *Pacific Affairs*, vol. XXXV, No. 3, Fall 1962, p. 216.

between the two became strained in the fall of 1955, when in December, during their visit to India and Afghanistan, Bulganin and Khrushchev declared their support to the right of self-determination for 5,000,000 Pakhtoons¹³ living in West Pakistan and accepted the accession of Kashmir¹⁴ to India.

While commenting on the Russian stand, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan stated:

It is extraordinary that while Bulganin is prepared to give the right of self-determination to the frontier tribesmen who are part and parcel of the sovereign state of Pakistan and who never wanted it, he denies the same right to the people of Kashmir who are struggling for it.¹⁵

As the statements made by the Russian leaders were detrimental to the advancement of good relations with Pakistan, N.A. Bulganin, in February 1956, offered Pakistan technical assistance and Russia's technical knowledge in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.¹⁶ Besides, during his visit to Karachi in the spring of 1956, the Soviet Deputy Premier made the "stunning remark" on the Kashmir issue that "its fate should be decided by consulting the will of the people". It was interpreted as siding with Pakistan's position on a plebscite.¹⁷ While commenting on these different statements of Soviet leaders in Karachi and New Delhi, *Eastern Economist*, an Indian weekly, said that

the U.S.S.R. is prepared to play an equally generous role as suitor in both countries. In a sense India has lost her favoured position with the U.S.S.R. since the same advances are now being made to Pakistan.¹⁸

The drive for friendship reached its climax when in March 1956, the Soviet Deputy Prime Minister declared that whatever may be the attitude of Pakistan towards military alliances, Russia wanted friendship with her.¹⁹ Moreover, during the festivities celebrating Pakistan's proclamation as a republic in March 1956 in Moscow, Molotov, the then Foreign Minister of Russia, offered a steel mill. The concrete result of the new approach was

13. *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, December 18, 1955 cited in M.A. Choudhary "Pakistan and the Soviet Bloc", *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. IX, No. 2, June 1956, p. 76.

14. N.A. Bulganin and N.S. Khrushchev, *Speeches during sojourn in India, Burma and Afghanistan* (Representative of Tass in India, New Delhi, 1956), pp. 83-86. Cited in J.A. Naik, "Soviet Policy on Kashmir", *Foreign Affairs Reports*, vol. XVI, No. 12, December 1967, p. 7.

15. M.A. Chaudhary, n. 13, p. 77. For the views of Prime Minister Mohammed Ali, who sharply criticized the Soviet leaders, see *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. VIII, No. 4, December 1955, p. 522.

16. Vijay Sen Budhraj, No. 4, p. 353.

17. Werner Levi, n. 12, p. 217.

18. *Eastern Economist*, vol. XXVI, No. 13, March 30, 1956, p. 514.

19. *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, March 29, 1956, cited in M.A. Choudhary, n. 13, p. 80.

the signing in June 1956 of the first trade agreement between the two countries.²⁰ The agreement provided for "developing trade between both countries based on equal rights and mutual advantage". The most important feature of the agreement was that the Soviet Union recognised the Pakistani currency.²¹

SOVIET VETO

Since the Soviet Union was interested in improving her relations, she invited the Prime Minister of Pakistan to Moscow, but like Liaqat Ali Khan, he went to Washington in the hope that the strained relations between New Delhi and Washington would give Pakistan an opportunity to secure the clear-cut help of Washington on the Kashmir issue. But, to the clear dissatisfaction of Pakistan, the resolution supported by Britain and the United States in February 1957 in the Security Council was vetoed by the Soviet Union. While defending her stand, the Russian representative called the resolution as being against the United Nations Charter and insulting to the people of Kashmir.²² The main objection of the Soviet Union was that it called for the stationing of U.N. troops in Kashmir. This step of the Soviet leaders damaged the relations between Moscow and Karachi to such an extent that neither proceeded further for improvement in relations.

In October 1958, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani army, captured power by overthrowing the civilian government. As Marshal Ayub Khan was responsible to a large extent for the Pakistani alliances with the Western Powers, the relations with the Soviet Union were bound to be strained. U.S. military assistance without which "the Pakistan Army could not have been equipped and reorganized. . . . was made possible through the . . . efforts of General Ayub Khan." The scheme was "born in his mind and it was through his negotiations with American political and military leaders" that Washington invited Pakistan "to enter into a Mutual Defence Pact."²³ According to Colonel Mohammed:

In August 1952, when General Jilani was about to leave for America to take over his appointment as the Military, Naval and Air Attache in that country, he was briefed by General Ayub to negotiate with the authority at the Pentagon and impress upon them the desirability of strengthening Pakistan militarily, for the security of the Middle East and South-East Asia. The idea was to examine the possibilities of Pakistan joining in a defence alliance.²⁴

Moreover, it was well known that Ayub Khan had accompanied the Prime

20. Werner Levi, n. 12, p. 217.

21. Vijay Sen Budhraj, n. 4, p. 353.

22. *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, February 21, 1957.

23. Colonel Mohammed Ahmed, *My Chief* (Longman, Green & Co. Pakistan Branch Lahore), First published, 1960, pp. 73-74.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

Minister during his visit to the United States in the fall of 1953, and immediately after their visit Pakistan had entered into a military alliance with the Western Powers, particularly designed against the Soviet Union by any definition. Ayub's pro-America views convinced the leaders in the Kremlin that the United States had a hand in the coup and that when "Washington realized that the parliamentary regime" in Pakistan "could not continue to follow a policy suitable to the United States, it was liquidated".²⁵ The Soviet leaders viewed that the military coup demonstrated that an attack was developing against the democratic gains which had won national independence.²⁶ On September 5, 1959, the Russian Government went to the extent of charging that "the Pakistan Government was trying to camouflage the setting up of military bases" in Pakistan "under American direction". The U-2 incident of May 1960 led to a further deterioration of relations between the two countries. Prime Minister Khrushchev is said to have threatened to destroy the Peshawar military base.²⁷

Events in 1960 took a new shape when J.F. Kennedy won the Presidential election in the United States. Under the influence of his Harvard advisers, he laid stress on the Indian leadership of South-East Asia. This aroused consternation in Karachi, and Pakistani misgivings were not set at rest in spite of the fact that the U.S. Ambassador in Pakistan made it clear that there was no question of the United States wishing that "the leadership of one nation should be imposed on other nations".²⁸ Even before Mr. Kennedy came to power, he urged the United States to give unqualified support to India. He said:

Unless India is able to demonstrate an ability at least equal to that of China to make the transition from economic stagnation to growth, so that it can get ahead of its exploding population, the entire Free World will suffer a serious reverse.²⁹

In 1958, as a Senator, Kennedy had joined Senator Sherman Cooper, a former U.S. Ambassador to India, in sponsoring a resolution in the Senate pledging the United States' support to India's economic planning.³⁰ All this gave the impression in Pakistan that the Kennedy Administration would safeguard the interests of New Delhi, which was detrimental to Pakistan.

25. D. Volsky, "Two Coups", *New Times*, No. 51, December 1958, p. 16, cited in Vijay Sen Budhraj, n. 4, p. 355.

26. *Pravda*, January 28, 1959, cited in Devendra Kaushik, n. 10, p. 63.

27. M.A.H. Ispahani, "The Foreign Policy of Pakistan", *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. XVII, No. 3, Third Quarter, 1964, p. 245.

28. See *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, May 26, 1961, and *The York Times*, June 10, 1961 cited in M.S. Venkatramani and H.C. Arya, "America's Military Alliance with Pakistan : The Evolution and Course of an Uneasy Partnership", *International Studies*, vol. 8, July 1966-April 1967, p. 111.

29. Cited in Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy : An Analysis of Pakistani Fears and Interests", *Asian Survey*, vol. IV, No. 3, March 1964, p. 753.

30. D.R. Mankekar, "Late President Kennedy's Interest in India", *The Indian Express*, November 27, 1963.

The U.S. enquiry whether American arms had been used in a military action against Afghanistan in the summer of 1961, caused alarm in Pakistan about the intention of Washington. Therefore, she wanted a stronger orientation towards the Soviet bloc. On February 1, 1961, an article by a Pakistani leader (M.A.M. Ispahani, former Ambassador of Pakistan to America) appeared in *Dawn* (Karachi) under the caption "Blow Zephyr, Blow". It said:

It was a disastrous policy to alienate half of the world (the Socialist Bloc) by going out of our way to be unfriendly to it. Not to accept their policy or ideology does not necessarily mean that at every opportunity both within and outside the United Nations we should throw road blocs in their way. This attitude was most painful to those who saw their nose tips.³¹

Since Moscow was determined to eliminate the influence of America in Pakistan, she responded favourably. The result was that on March 4, 1961, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union and Pakistan on the exploration of oil in Pakistan. Negotiations for this agreement had begun even before the U-2 incident, and resulted from the Pakistan Government's suspicion that "the prospecting previously done by a Western group had not been carried on with all possible vigour".³²

CHANGED STAND

Hereafter the Pakistani leaders began to show friendly attitude towards China and the Soviet Union. Up to 1960 Pakistan voted with the Western Powers in the United Nations with regard to China's entry in it, but in December 1961, she sided with the Soviet Union when she supported the resolution for the expulsion of Nationalist China and its replacement by Red China. Moreover, by the summer of 1962 Pakistan's attitude towards her military alliance had undergone a remarkable change. When there appeared the possibility that SEATO might call for the contribution of troops to protect Thailand, Pakistan made it clear in anticipation that "no contribution would come from her because all her troops were needed in Kashmir."³³ Besides, in May 1962, the Pakistani Foreign Minister had made it clear that Pakistan's membership of SEATO was in no way a hurdle in the way of friendly relations between Rawalpindi and the Soviet bloc. But the Kashmir dispute still blocked the way. When in the summer of 1962 the Irish delegate introduced a resolution recommending that the Kashmir dispute should be resolved on the basis of principles contained in the Security Council resolution of January 17, 1948 and of UNCIP resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 1, 1949, the Soviet representative vetoed it, and said that

it would be completely unrealistic to refer to resolutions of 14 years ago because of the changes which had taken place in the

31. See M.A.H. Ispahani, n. 27.

32. Werner Levi, n. 12, p. 218.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 221.

intervening period; he wondered whether those who sought to refer to them seriously believed that a plebiscite could be held at this juncture; to do so would constitute a flagrant interference in the domestic affairs of India. Similarly, the idea that some form of arbitration or mediation should be introduced into the bilateral talks was also invalid. The talks could take place only if both sides desired . . . they could not be imposed. It would be best for the Council to limit its present discussions to taking note of the fact that both India and Pakistan had stated that they would not initiate the use of force in solving the Kashmir question and that neither party had rejected the idea of bilateral negotiations.³⁴

The Government in Rawalpindi did take it lightly and continued its efforts to improve relations with Moscow. Certain events in the fall of 1962 proved quite beneficial for the development of friendly relations between the two; India's humiliating defeat against China in October 1962,³⁵ the growing influence of America and Britain in New Delhi, the intimacy between Pakistan and China and the rift between Moscow and Peking made the Soviet leaders realise that their South Asian policy—exclusively centered round New Delhi—was damaging and detrimental to their interests. Under these circumstances Moscow decided in favour of a stronger orientation towards Pakistan to wean her away from China. Before 1962 the aim of Soviet leaders was to eliminate the influence of Washington in Pakistan but after the Indo-Chinese conflict they were inclined to minimise the Chinese influence. To achieve this aim some friendly gestures were essential. The result was that between 1963 and 1965 Russia and Pakistan signed a number of agreements establishing a Moscow-Karachi air service, an agreement for exchange of news and teleprinter services with Tass and a cultural agreement.³⁶ In so far as the Kashmir issue was concerned Russia adopted a soft attitude. Unlike 1957 and 1962, in the summer of 1964, in the Security Council, the Soviet representative no longer insisted on the finality of Kashmir's accession to India but instead emphasized the need for direct negotiations between India and Pakistan to resolve their differences.³⁷

34. *Yearbook of the United Nations* (Office of Public Information, United Nations, New York, 1962), p. 130.

35. When the Indo-Chinese conflict started in 1962, the flow of American weaponry to India began on a large scale. The Soviet Union was very puzzled about this state of affairs, that is why it was preparing the ground for American influence. She was not against the defence of Indian frontiers but it remains in fact that the American influence was not to her liking at any cost. Soviet official circles became more disturbed when New Delhi and Washington signed an agreement for setting up a powerful transmitter in the Calcutta area for use by All India Radio, in return for time for Voice of America broadcasts. The Soviet leaders were perturbed over this development as Moscow always identified the Voice of America as a cold war weapon. *The Hindu*, Madras, July 21, 1963.

36. Vijay Sen Budhraj, n. 4, p. 357.

37. See *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, July 18, 1968.

NEUTRALITY

A positive proof of the shift in Soviet policy from a pro-India stance to one of neutrality became manifest in April 1965 when fighting broke out between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch. Moscow refrained from taking sides and called for a peaceful settlement of the dispute.³⁸ Earlier when Pakistani President Ayub Khan visited the Soviet Union in April 1965, the joint communique issued in Moscow contained a formula on national liberation movements ambiguous enough to be applicable to Kashmir and, indeed, was so interpreted by Karachi media.³⁹ While commenting on this move on April 8, 1965, *Dawn* (Karachi) remarked that it had broken "the barrier" that "Indian diplomacy had succeeded in erecting between Pakistan and the Soviet Union" for a longer period.⁴⁰ Another outcome of this visit was that Russia agreed to provide a credit of Rs. 120—250 million to Pakistan for the purchase of machinery.⁴¹ Viewed against the background of the past decade, it was a great success for Rawalpindi.

When the India-Pakistani armed conflict of September 1965 started, the Soviet Union took another step to demonstrate her neutrality. *Pravda* warned China and advised both India and Pakistan to stop fighting.⁴² Like Washington, Moscow realized that the war would weaken both India and Pakistan and would encourage Peking to exploit the situation. When China started making threatening noises and gave an ultimatum to India, the Indo-Pak war assumed a new turn. It was felt in Moscow that Chinese intervention would bring Washington into the conflict on the Indian side that would be detrimental to the Soviet interests in South Asia. To avoid this eventuality Premier Kosygin made four separate appeals to India and Pakistan for a peaceful settlement of the dispute and offered Soviet good offices.⁴³ Consequently Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President

38. See *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. XIX, No. 1, First Quarter, 1966, p. 6.

39. The communique stated that both sides declared resolute support of the peoples waging a struggle for national liberation and independence and of peoples fighting for the right to decide their future at their own discretion. Sheldon W. Simon, "The Kashmir Dispute in Sino-Soviet Perspective", *Asian Survey*, vol. VII, No. 3, March 1967, p. 178.

40. M.A. Chaudhary, "Pakistan Relations with the Soviet Union", *Asian Survey*, vol. VI, No. 9, September 1966, p. 495.

41. Zubeida Hasan, "Pakistan's Relations with the U.S.S.R. in 1960s", *The World Today*, vol. 25, No. 1, January 1969, p. 34. See also *Pakistan Horizon*, Second Quarter, vol. XXI, No. 2, 1968, p. 152.

42. *Pravda*, September 14, 1965.

43. At this time the stand taken by the Soviet Union was contrary to what was declared by Khrushchev on December 10, 1955. He had stated that the Kashmir question which was created by some interested colonial powers, had been dealt with finally by the people themselves when they had decided to join the Indian Union and that the Soviet Government accepted their decision. J.A. Naik, n. 14, pp. 83-86.

Ayub Khan⁴⁴ agreed to meet in Tashkent. It was the first time when a Communist country played the role of a mediator in the conflict of non-Communist countries. The major consequence of this meeting was that both India and Pakistan agreed to withdraw their armies to their position of August 5, 1965. Though the aim of this paper is not to evaluate the importance of the Tashkent Declaration, it is pertinent to note that it was a great achievement of Soviet diplomacy. According to a Pakistan observer:

The Tashkent Conference proved to be a major triumph for the Russians in their first diplomatic undertaking in Asian affairs. They achieved the goals they had set for themselves, namely, the restoration of status quo ante bellum and a declaration by both sides to abjure war. True, the Conference failed to effect a detente between India and Pakistan but it did result in creating a new Soviet image—that of a guarantor of peace in the sub-continent.... Most significant of all was the impact of the meeting on Pakistan—U.S.S.R. relations. The Russians succeeded in erasing the impression created earlier by Khrushchev of Soviet partisanship for India. President Ayub Khan commended the Soviet leaders for observing strict neutrality throughout the negotiations and the Pakistani press was unanimous in its praise of Premier Kosygin's statesmanship.⁴⁵

By the end of the Tashkent Declaration it had become clear that the Soviet Union was no longer an unqualified supporter of the Indian cause. She had started to woo Pakistan by maintaining strict neutrality in the Indo-Pak conflict.⁴⁶ Though the ultimate aim of Russia was not to sacrifice her friendship with India, her move at Tashkent resulted in the withdrawal of Indian forces from strategic points which led to the criticism of Russian stand in some circles. Moreover, the Soviet Union's unqualified support to India on the Kashmir issue also evaporated in the sense that she began to recognise it as a disputed territory. As a matter of fact, what the Soviet leaders did not say with regard to the Kashmir dispute is as significant, if not more, as what they said. They did not say that Moscow accepted the basis of Kashmir's accession to India, viz. the instrument of accession

44. Since Rawalpindi was heavily dependent on U.S. military and economic assistance, and since Washington had approved the Soviet initiative, President Ayub Khan had absolutely no room for any manoeuvre. He was directed to accept Soviet good offices for a meeting with the Indian Prime Minister to iron out their differences on negotiating table. M.S. Rajan, "The Tashkent Declaration: Retrospect and Prospect", *International Studies*, vol. 8, July 1966, and April 1967, p. 6.

45. Zubeida Hasan, n. 41, p. 33.

46. Russia's entire strategy in South Asia had collapsed due to a rift between Peking and Moscow and her presence in Asia had been practically eliminated. She started picking the pieces and her policy towards the subcontinent underwent a subtle change. She needed and valued the Indian friendship but thought that simultaneous relations with Pakistan would facilitate the new role of Moscow. The leaders in the Kremlin hoped to assist both India and Pakistan and with them to provide a new balance in Asia. V.P. Dutt, "Indo-Soviet Relations : Common Interests", *National Herald* (New Delhi), December 31, 1969.

signed by the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir on October 6, 1947. The emphasis on the people of Kashmir was also not without significance. It was implied that in case of doubt the will of the people could be ascertained again.⁴⁷

REASONS FOR SHIFT

The question may, however, be asked: why did Moscow abandon the pro-India stance in the Indo-Pak conflict? By 1964 the Soviet Union became aware of the weakness of its South Asian policy exclusively centred round New Delhi. Moreover, the Cuban crisis and growing influence of America and China in Pakistan compelled the Soviet Union to change her policy towards the subcontinent. When in 1955, Russian leaders declared their support to India on the Kashmir issue, the cold war was at its climax. By that time Pakistan had entered into alliances with the United States, which were particularly designed against the Soviet bloc. Under such circumstances, it was natural on the part of the Soviet Union to support non-aligned India against an aligned Pakistan. But in 1965, the circumstances were quite different. India's humiliating defeat in 1962, China's growing strength and her intention to exploit the situation during the Indo-Pak conflict in 1965 highlighted the importance of an accommodation between New Delhi and Rawalpindi. To achieve this end the Soviet Union had to abandon her pro-India stand. This led to normalization of relations between Moscow and Rawalpindi.

On her part, Pakistan had been assiduous in her effort to live down the U-2 incident and to assure the Russian leaders that her membership of Washington-sponsored military alliances was in no way a reflection of Pakistan's hostility to the Soviet Union but was directed purely — so far as Rawalpindi was concerned — against India. It was a measure of success of Pakistani strategy that their frank acknowledgment that the entire thrust of their foreign policy was against India and that, therefore, their courtship of one Big Power was not inimical to the interest of the rival Big Power had created conviction in Moscow.⁴⁸ Besides, in 1965, Pakistan refused to support the U.S. policy in Vietnam.⁴⁹ All this gave the impression in the Soviet Union that Pakistan really wanted better relations with the Soviet bloc. Moreover, with the passage of time Pakistan ceased to take interest

47. Vijay Sen Budhraj, n. 4, p. 358.

48. V.P. Dutt, "India, Pakistan and the Soviet Union", *National Herald*, New Delhi, April 24, 1966. When Ayub Khan first time met Kosygin in 1965 in a village 25 miles far from Moscow, he left an indelible impression on the Soviet leaders by saying that their entire strategy was designed against India. See Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography* (Karachi, Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 170.

49. Earlier in 1964, in an interview with the B.B.C. in London, Ayub Khan made it clear that should there be any serious confrontation between China and the U.S. over North Vietnam, Pakistan in spite of her SEATO obligations would not get involved. George J. Lerski, "The Pakistan-American Alliance: A Revaluation of the past Decade", *Asian Survey*, vol. VIII, No. 5, May 1968, p. 411.

in the military pacts and recalled her representative from the SEATO Military Advisers' Group.⁵⁰

Above all, whereas an apparently pro-India stance in 1955 was the result of the American alliance with Pakistan, the policy of treating India and Pakistan on equal footing in 1965 became essential in view of the threat of China.⁵¹ Rawalpindi's "control over Gilgit", in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir "a key point of Sino-Soviet strategic manoeuvring"—and its "obsession with increasing . . . military power" at every cost "to even the balance" with New Delhi, India's "attachment with the policy of non-alignment" and her performance in the 1962 and 1965 armed conflicts gave Rawalpindi "a better bargaining position than India".⁵²

Under these circumstances, by 1967 the relations between the Soviet Union and Pakistan became better than ever before in the past decade. Since the maintenance of good relations with Rawalpindi was in the interest of the Soviet Union, and since it was felt in Moscow that what India did not give to the Western Powers in the 50s was not likely to revise her policy in favour of the Soviet Union in the 60s, they did not pay any heed to the Indian interests. Pakistan also played quite an important role in the furtherance of such development. When in September 1967 President Ayub Khan again visited the Soviet Union, he was closer to the Russian line of thought than to that of the American on the Vietnam issue. He is said to have declared that there was need for immediate cessation of the war in Vietnam in acknowledgement of the right of the Vietnamese people to decide their fate for themselves without outside interference as envisaged in the Geneva Agreement of 1954. He also expressed similar views on the Arab-Israel conflict. Moreover, Islamabad had built a good image in the Soviet Union. According to a Russian observer:

More and more people in Pakistan are coming to realize that participation in the aggressive SEATO and CENTO blocs has done Pakistan no good and that these blocs are tools of U.S. aggressive policy the aim of which is to divert Pakistan from its way of independent development and to embroil it in military gambles.⁵³

This led the Soviet Union to take another step to woo Pakistan. When, on the invitation of Pakistani President Ayub Khan, Kosygin visited Rawalpindi in April 1968, he agreed to sell arms to Pakistan on the same conditions on which Russia was selling to India. Here it is important to

50. B. Pyadyshev, "New Developments in Pakistan", *International Affairs* (Moscow), June 1968, p. 78.

51. According to *The Observer* (London), the object of the Russian foreign policy from the very beginning has been the security of her southern flank. The leaders in the Kremlin rarely confuse ideology and other considerations with diplomacy.

52. Vijay Sen Budhraj, n. 4, p. 358.

53. S. Alexandrov, "Pakistan : Twenty Years of Independence", *International Affairs* (Moscow), September 1967, p. 87.

note that the major cause of Soviet opposition to the military pacts of Pakistan was eliminated on the eve of Kosygin's visit to Rawalpindi when she gave notice to Washington for the termination of the lease of the American Communication Unit at Budaber near Peshawar, thus depriving the United States of the few remaining strategic benefits she derived from her military alliance with Pakistan.⁵⁴ According to *The Daily Telegraph*:

The removal a week ago of the last American air base in Pakistan, from which U-2 flights and other reconnaissance of Russia were launched, was regarded as part of the bargain under which Pakistan has acquired Russian weapons.⁵⁵

An Indian scholar observed:

Partly responding to Pakistan overtures, partly hoping to reduce the impact of Chinese presence in Pakistan and partly to compete with Washington, the Soviets gradually moved towards a more active presence in Islamabad. Once this decision had been taken, the supply of arms to Pakistan on some scale or another was inevitable. It would have been impossible for the Soviet Union to carry Pakistan along with her in the promotion of this policy if she did not seem to look after the defence needs of that country.⁵⁶

The surprising thing is that the Soviet Union adopted the policy which was denounced by her in 1964. In February 1964, Soviet Communist Party theoretician Michail Suslov, reporting to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party on relations with China, taunted the Chinese on their choice of friends. China was sparing no effort to befriend Pakistan, which was a part of the Western network of military alliances, but was reserving her enmity and hostility for India, which was non-aligned and independent, Suslov pointed out.⁵⁷ The Russian leaders defended their stand and said that their proposed arms deal with Pakistan would act as a check against her going wholly into the orbit of Chinese influence. According to an Indian daily:

The Moscow view seems to be that the Chinese influence over Pakistan developed after the stoppage of arms aid by the U.S.⁵⁸

ECONOMIC PACT

In so far as the economic field is concerned, the Soviet Government signed an agreement with Rawalpindi on economic cooperation in September 1966. Under this the U.S.S.R. undertook to render technical aid in the construction of twenty-one projects, including two plants for the production

54. Zubeida Hasan, n. 41, p. 29.

55. *The Daily Telegraph* (London), April 15, 1969.

56. V.P. Dutt, n. 46.

57. V.P. Dutt, "India, Pakistan and the Soviet Union", *National Herald*, New Delhi, April 24, 1968.

58. See *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, May 9, 1968.

of electrical machinery, the Guddu Thermal Power Station, fifteen broadcasting houses, a higher voltage transmission line, and a railway-cum-highway bridge across the River Rupsa. To finance these projects the Soviet Government granted a long-term state credit of Rs. 20 million and a commercial credit of Rs. 300 million at 2.5 per cent interest. By the end of 1967 the Soviet Union had committed Rs. 875 million in economic assistance for Pakistan's Third Five Year Plan. During his visit Mr. Kosygin agreed to finance a steel mill at Kalabagh costing Rs. 500 million, a nuclear power plant of Rooppur, a radio link between Karachi and Moscow, and a fishery development project.⁵⁹

By the end of 1968 the situation became quite clear. In disregard to the Indian protest, Soviet arms began to flow to Pakistan. In pursuance of the decision taken in July 1968, the first batch of tanks reached Islamabad in the first half of 1969.⁶⁰ At the same time, during his visit to Pakistan, the Vice-Admiral of the Soviet navy said that "a powerful Pakistani navy would be a good pre-condition for peace in this part of Indian Ocean". Since it aroused concern in New Delhi, and since it was not in conformity with the system of collective security stated during the World Communist Conference of June 1969, it was denied by the Press Department of the Soviet Foreign Office in July 1969.

When in May 1969, Prime Minister Kosygin visited Islamabad, President Yahya Khan accepted the Soviet plan of Collective security in Asia. As the Soviet Union became jubilant over this, she accepted Pakistan's request for more tanks to be sent in June 1969. The objectives of sending this war material to Pakistan were "assessed in New Delhi as an interest in maintaining Russian security and a desire to secure . . . facilities in Pakistan for their submarine-bound sailors in Russia's new efforts to establish a credible presence in the Indian Ocean." To secure these facilities, Russia went a step further when in July 1969, she offered technical assistance and an agreement was signed between the two countries.

BARTER DEALS

In spite of the fact that President Yahya Khan frustrated the Russian move for regional trade and transit facilities,⁶¹ in August 1969, the Soviet

59. Zubeida, Hasan, n. 41, p. 34.

60. See the statement of the Minister for Defence Production in *The Hindustan Times*, March 15, 1969.

61. President Yahya Khan went back on his commitments when he rejected the Afghan Government's invitation to meet in Kabul to consider the plan jointly with Iran, Turkey, India and Afghanistan. This demonstrated that Pakistan was not prepared to divorce trade from politics, and what was more important, feared that India's sheer size and economic power would tend to make it possible for New Delhi to dominate the regional economic co-operation arrangement. V.S. Budhraj, "From Tashkent to Teaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation : A Study of Recent trends in Moscow's South Asian Policy", *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, vol. XXXII, October-December 1971, No. 4, p. 497.

Union entered into a deal with Pakistan for exchange of rice for low-grade Soviet kerosene. Another agreement between the two reached in December 1969 under which the Soviet Union undertook to send machinery in exchange for cotton, jute etc.

The drive for detaching Pakistan from China and the United States reached the climax when in the second half of 1970 the Soviet Union proposed to supply Pakistan with SU-7 bombers and missiles boats.⁶² Earlier in March 1970, it had been made clear in the House of People by the then Indian Defence Minister, Sardar Swaran Singh that the Soviet Union had supplied T. 54 and T. 55 tanks to Pakistan.⁶³

When the civil war broke out in Bangla Desh, the Soviet Union maintained normal relations with Pakistan. But in June 1971, when Mr. Swaran Singh, the Indian Foreign Minister, visited the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Kosygin called for conditions to be created to enable millions of Bengali refugees who had flooded into India, to return to their homeland.⁶⁴ As it was a clear-cut anti-Pakistan stand, the generals sitting in Islamabad turned it down outright. Relations between the two deteriorated sharply in July 1971 when the Soviet leaders had been practically irritated by President Yahya Khan's disregard to their appeals to modify his repressive policy in Bangla Desh and to come to terms with Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. Besides the role played by Yahya Khan in arranging Dr. Henry Kissinger's visit to Peking also jolted Moscow severely. At this time it became clear that Rawalpindi was inclined to safeguard the interests of Peking and Washington at the cost of the Soviet Union. This led the Soviet leaders to adopt a pro-India attitude in the Indo-Pak conflict. In September 1971, Moscow warned both Pakistan and China and declared that it was impossible to justify the actions of the Pakistani authorities which compelled over eight million people to leave their country, land and property to seek shelter in neighbouring India. Later at Moscow airport, Kosygin is said to have stated:

No quarter which committed such atrocities could enjoy our support. Our sympathies are with the democratic forces of Pakistan.⁶⁵

Ultimately, Soviet hostility towards Pakistan in the Indo-Pak conflict resulted in a humiliating defeat and disintegration of Pakistan.

In the concluding lines, it may be said that national interest has been the touchstone in the relations between Moscow and Rawalpindi. Whereas in the 50s the main aim of the Soviet leaders in improving their relations with

62. See *Asian Recorder*, vol. 16, No. 15, April 9, 1970, p. 9477.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 9633.

64. *National Herald*, New Delhi and *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, June 10, 1971.

65. Devendra Kaushik, *Indo-Soviet Treaty in Action*, Kamal Publications, New Delhi, undated, p. 1.

Pakistan was to remove the influence of Washington in Rawalpindi, in the 60s she was dictated by the presence of Peking. Pakistan's control over some strategic points coupled with her growing intimacy with Peking, India's weakness and the influence of Washington in New Delhi in the 60s also played an equally significant role in Russia's policy towards the subcontinent. But the Soviet Union had to face rough weather, as a result of which she again turned to New Delhi in the 70s. India's growing strength and Pakistan's uncertain future compelled the Soviet Union to revise her policy to play a considerable role in South Asia.

So far as Pakistan is concerned, her policy centres round the Kashmir issue and fear of India. In the early 50s she joined American-sponsored military alliances to secure Washington's vigorous support on the Kashmir question in the Security Council and to build herself against India, but when in the 60s the United States did not seem to support Pakistan wholeheartedly, she turned to the Soviet Union for the achievement of these aims. Since the Soviet Union wanted to carry both India and Pakistan with her in the subcontinent, and since Pakistan was interested in maintaining her relations with Peking and Washington also, Moscow and Rawalpindi could not remain together for a longer period. Moreover, Pakistan's role in bringing Peking and Washington nearer to each other is also responsible for this eventuality. The net result is that Pakistan again started to dance to the tune of America and China. The Soviet Union has adopted her old policy of supporting India against Pakistan. Since both remained unsuccessful in their objectives, they will again try to normalize their relations, and it seems New Delhi will have to pay its price again.

DECISION MAKING

LIEUT COLONEL S C SIRDHAPANDE, VSM

"The greatest commander was he whose intuition nearly happened".
—TE LAWRENCE.

"If I appear to be always ready to reply to every thing, it is because before undertaking anything I have meditated for a long time—I have foreseen what might happen. It is not a spirit which suddenly reveals to me what I have to say or do in a circumstance unexpected by others; it is reflection, meditation." —NAPOLEON.

INTRODUCTION

In the profession of arms, resolving problems and situations involving danger, fear, death and destruction depend on decisions. This is one profession where learning and perfecting it by live experimentation is not feasible, as human lives are involved. One depends, perforce, on others' experiences and examples. Under such handicap, decision-making has to be of a high calibre in terms of quality, quantity and time taken to decide. It is the correctness, quickness and maturity of decision that decides the issue, favourably or otherwise. Under stresses, strains, fear, lack of information and the overwhelming responsibility of achieving success and saving lives, such high calibre decisions may have to be made repeatedly, in increasing frequency. Time and data are always inadequate. Every decision is a precipice overlooking an unknown abyss. Yet the brave decide to plunge, often calculatedly, occasionally intuitively. That then is the test of leadership.

To "decide" is to "settle" (compromise is its implication); to "bring to resolution" (emphasis is on its thoroughly critical examination to reduce it to a key beam); to "give judgement" (with stress on wisdom in and experienced evaluating). It is also interpreted as "reduction of alternatives to one, most advantageous". We seldom pay attention to these meanings and their implications while taking decisions so many times in our routine, daily life. However occasions do arise when one has to pause before deciding. This is where the study and knowledge of decision-making stand in good stead. Gravity of situations, acute shortage of time and fleeting opportunities demand that decision-making be understood, studied and practised to an efficient degree.

The aim of this paper is to study decision-making and its practice in the military. The discussion will progress through the following stages:

- (a) Mechanics of decision-making.
- (b) Forces of decision-making.
- (c) Thinking.
- (d) Influencing factors.
- (e) Training in decision-making.

MECHANICS OF DECISION-MAKING

“**A**PPRECIATION of a military situation” fits in admirably with the process of decision making. Every appreciation is carried out with the single intention of arriving at a solution, a decision. It is a logical method, time-tested and well tried.

To start, a review of the situation is made, whenever there is a problem. This enables us to get as much of the data as possible. The next step is to define the problem precisely, based on the, data, with the precision of a crystal separated from its casing and cleared of its spots and smears. The crystal needs its casing for carriage, so the casing can't be thrown away. That becomes the “term of reference.” The separating and cleaning of the crystal of its smears itself is an appreciation leading to a decision suggesting what precisely the problem is—the aim. It is important to identify the exact problem and evolve the correct aim.

Follows the critical examination of factors influencing the achievement of the aim. This stage really is the essence of the person's richness and variety of thoughts and his efficiency. The more the wisdom, experience, ingenuity, knowledge and objectivity he brings to the critical examination, the firmer is the foundation for deciding and the maturer the alternatives thrown up.

Alternatives (also called possibilities) so emerging are now evaluated. Once again knowledge, experience, ingenuity, attitudes, logical enquiry and mental make-up play an important part in examining the courses open. It is pertinent to bear in mind Mohtke's “if you consider that the enemy has two courses open, he invariably follows the third.”

In the next step, before accepting the suggested decision (course adopted) the mind again harks back to the circumstances and aim and tries to measure the strength and weakness of the suggested solution. This ensures that there is no haste or deficiency in examination and evaluation. The mind then scrutinises the decision in the light of consequences, effects and implications, so that adequate measures can be taken to plug deficiencies and exploit possibilities. Then the decision is taken.

The process will be incomplete without giving due consideration to the execution of the decision. Situations may change, time may run out, resources may disappear, opportunities may arise. A constant review of the feasibility and adequacy of the decision and its execution, therefore, is imperative. This, however, does not mean that changes in decision should be made equally frequently; in fact it should be avoided. A change should only be made if entirely new influences appear, or influences existing at the time of the decision are no more valid. Changing a decision itself will be a decision, following the same mechanics all over. To facilitate this process, the person making a decision should identify in it likely areas and timings requiring subsequent changes in decision and note the point of no return, that is, the stage and time beyond which it is impractical and unwise to change the original decision.

This much for individual decision-making technique. A variant is collective decision-making or sharing decision. There is no need to frown on this method if used in our profession. This does not mean majority view or compromise. It means pooling ideas, generating confidence and effecting a sense of participation and hence better execution. The method basically is the same. Instead of one brain processing the problem, a group of competent individuals or important participants is doing it. War games, operational conferences and discussions are examples. These variants can be as shown below:—

- (a) The commander has already decided. He wants to test it by sounding the board—his staff and subordinates.
- (b) The commander, having decided, explains the decision and its implication to his subordinates.
- (c) The commander enumerates the ingredients of a problem, suggests a few clues and throws them to discussion in a body of his subordinates. Thereafter a decision is taken.
- (d) The commander defines an ambit and lays down guidelines therein. His subordinates and staff work out a number of possibilities. The commander selects a possibility. This method, however, needs a high degree of rapport between the commander and his subordinates. Moreover it is prone to degenerating into “the staff making a decision and the commander consenting”; which is to be avoided. The commander must impress his personality and stamp his ideas on the process; and check them frequently.

FORCES OF DECISION MAKING

The three elements affecting decision-making area:—

- (a) The individual (the leader).
- (b) The group (the led).
- (c) The environment (the situation).

The Individual

Napoleon, when told of the soldierly attributes of one of his officers is said to have asked "...but is he lucky?" A careful examination of this enigmatic question will reveal what he really wanted to know; that is, if that officer had developed his faculty of thinking and store of knowledge to such an extent that he had mastered intuition so as to arrive at bold and correct decisions always. "Correct decisions always is luck indeed! So an individual's first requisite is his store of knowledge in its widest variety and greatest depth. Next, his faculty of imaginative and objective thinking. Then his experience and its wise utilisation—not as a rigid template but as a helpful guide to assess, judge, evaluate and provide clues. These three attributes, combined, may well produce a genius. Close on the heels are his involvement, mental attitudes, courage and integrity. Finally his standing within the triangle—subordinates, superiors and equals—.

The Group

An educated, responsive, enthusiastic group is a force to be reckoned with while decision making, as much as the one that is ignorant, lazy and despondent. The same goes for a group motivated and with high morale as against the one despirited and at low ebb. Slim's decision to press with his rapid advance beyond Meiktila to Rangoon despite administrative difficulties and exhaustion of his troops after the Irawaddy battles, seems to have resulted, among other reasons, from his implicit faith in and profound knowledge of his troops, their condition and response. His "drive that vehicle to Rangoon and then into the sea" order to his racing lead elements is indicative. MacArthur's Inchon stroke was decided on the basis of his absolute faith in and response of the US Navy and Marines, as much as on his strategic perception. A group so prepared, motivated and brought in step with its commander renders decision-making less onerous and more effective in exploitation of the force and execution of the decision. Selective participation of the group in the decision-making process is likely to deliver better results. This avenue needs exploring and more frequent practice, at the same time fully guarding its pitfalls.

The Situation

This hardly needs elaboration. A situation can accurately be assessed only by a discerning mind. It is also connected intimately with the individual and the group. Situations can be assessed differently by different individuals. For example, the situation assessment regarding enemy strength by units directly involved invariably may vary from that of the higher HQ. Forward troops' reports of "heavy enemy fire; cannot move" were decried by formation commanders as being "hallucinations." The opening situation of "Crusader" in Cyrenaica unnerved the Eighth Army Commander, Cunningham, whereas Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief, assessed entirely differently. The former wanted to break off battle and withdraw, whereas

the latter overruled the decision, turned the tables and brought off a resounding victory out of what seemed a hopeless situation.

Each situation has a number of sub-factors like enemy reactions, own capabilities, higher commander's plans, resources available, time, weather, terrain, administrative difficulties, loss and destruction, fatigue, reinforcements, national policy, morale and so on. These essentials have to be grasped, integrated and exploited.

There, then, is no short-cut to decision making except through careful study constructive thinking and utilisation of knowledge imaginatively.

THINKING

T.E. Lawrence has this interesting statement—"Nine-tenths of tactics were certain enough to be teachable in schools; but the irrational tenth was like the kingfisher flashing across the pool, and in it lay the test of generals. It could be ensured only by instinct, sharpened by thought practising the stroke, until at the crisis it came naturally, a reflex"-. Of note, here, are "the irrational tenth", "flashing across the pool", "ensured by instinct" and "instinct sharpened by the thought practising the stroke". How succinct! The irrational tenth is a rare gift; rarer is the attempt to feel the instinct. Sharpening instinct by thought, much less practising the stroke, is a far cry unless we delve into its internals.

Thinking is exercising our mind on and around a theme, an object, a problem. It involves three processes, namely, analysing, synthesizing and evaluating.

Analysing is stripping a whole into parts with their relative relationship to one another. It is the ability to see through a problem and grasp its essentials. Synthesizing is finding relation of parts to the whole; finding its construction. Evaluation is comparing with known facts, precedents, examples and surroundings. These three elements are closely related and overlapping and form a continuous process based on available information. If information is not available, it has to be obtained. Examining this process in the military environment will mean comparing it with the consideration of "factors" in our appreciation. For example, while considering ground, "it is 200 yards by 200 yards, not tankable, bare, can take one platoon to hold and one battery to neutralise" is analysis. "It is dominated by Bump, mutually supports Tila, provides depth to Choti, interferes with my movement in the area of Copse, should be taken in the first phase" is synthesis. Comparing this piece of ground and enemy deployment on it with some of the identical—or as near it—examples encountered earlier; or comparing two adjoining pieces of similar ground is evaluating. (It will also involve some analysing and synthesizing, hence the overlap).

A keen, perceptive mind with a rich experience is the main aid to thinking. Seeing, hearing, feeling, experiencing, and storing all this treasure in the depths of the brain, facilitating a continuous process of thinking are the keys to it. These assist in the development and utilisation of intuition. Intuition is the unconscious level of thinking which is not reasoned; or it is the quick perception of truth without conscious attention or reasoning. A solution or a decision is suddenly thrown up by intuition; the mind cannot reason it out or explain the logic behind it. It does not mean, however, that it is a miracle or an inexplicable inspiration at the last moment. Somewhere deep in the mind the vast store of information, knowledge and experience has acted and reacted on the problem subconsciously and the resultant decision or solution is thrown up in a surprise thrust, so to say.

An apt illustration of the process of thinking is to be found in the observant, experience-rich Lincoln. A fellow, lawyer of his describes how Lincoln, on seeing a new piece of farm machinery on his routine circuit travels, "would examine it in all parts, first closely, then at a distance, and finally, coming back to it, he would shake it, lift it, push it, 'sight' it to see whether it was straight or warped and stoop, or even lie down if necessary, to look under it, in order to ascertain its very quality and utility." In the lawyers' evening discussions which "ranged through the universe of thought and experience", Lincoln learned to apply the same careful process to propositions and ideas.

INFLUENCING FACTORS

Many factors influence decisions. These factors operate within the ambit of various forces of decision making discussed earlier. While these forces provide the skeleton, the influencing factors add skin, flesh, blood, form and pulse. They are discussed in the subsequent paras.

Utilization of Capabilities

Best utilization of one's capabilities, while guarding one's limitations, means constant study, utilization of experience, deep thinking and keeping fully abreast of the situation. The Israeli decision of striking first, or pre-emptive strike, is a valid illustration. With their limited but highly efficient resources, in view of the geographical compulsions imposed on the country, the Israeli decision to strike first and strike hard taking immense risks, sounds so logical from the point of view of full utilisation of their resources. Another example can be found in Churchill's urging Auchinleck to hurry up with "Crusader". The former's decision to hurry up with this operation in Cyrenaica resulted, among other factors, from the desirability of fully utilizing the then available resources and in time, so as not to allow the enemy time to strengthen.

Visualisation

Visualisation means looking ahead, anticipating what is on "the other side

of the hill", crystal-gazing, forethought. An active, alert, penetrating, imaginative mind, backed by knowledge, study and experience, hovering like Lawrence's kingfisher, ready to exploit, quick to plug holes, will be a good example. An object study in this category is the battle of El Alamein. Montgomery's deep study of the situation, knowledge of his opposite number, Rommel, visualisation of his enemy's moves and his experience stored through study and wars shaped his decision to bleed Rommel on Alam Halfa and Ruweiat and then take the offensive. If we analyse the decisive influences, say, in launching a counter-attack or launching reserves or in timing withdrawal, it will be clear that these are:—

- (a) Meditation on the subject even before the action started.
- (b) Uptodate knowledge of the situation.
- (c) Accurate visualisation.
- (d) Firm grip on the troops, in their positioning, movement and readiness.

Mental Attitudes

Attitudes towards the profession, men and institutions, towards personal ease and advancement, towards life's philosophy itself play a dominant part in decision making. A casual, careless, lethargic attitude will produce either no decisions at all or indifferent ones. Selfish, over-ambitious attitudes will produce cruel, dangerous decisions. Unpreparedness and ignorance will produce poor ones. A person with the direct responsibility of and concern for his men, unless adequately awakened, may appear "cautious", "too calculating", "obstructionist" and even lacking in drive and initiative in his decisions. The mind, unless brought up to a pitch, on to an attitudinal frequency, is not likely to make decisions in line with the trend of the situation as seen by others so attuned. A Co's mind, if not attuned by his seniors to the pitch of reality and seriousness of going to battle as visualised by the latter, is unlikely to take commensurate decisions. It is so because he directly bears certain moral responsibilities to his command as no other rank perhaps does.

Let us see another example—the battle of the Rapido in Italy in the World War II. Maj.-Gen Fred Walker, Commander of 36 Texas Division, US Army, was accused of lacking drive and having "no heart" in the attack across the Rapido. This war-hardened, brave general's decisions gave such impression because of his concern for the lives of his men in what he thought was an unwise operation. Gen Mark Clark, the army commander, who ordered this operation and decided to persist with its determined execution, was accused of being ambitious, disregarding his subordinates' points of view out of hand and even callousness towards the loss of human lives. Both were outstanding generals of the US Army. But their decisions were influenced by their attitudes.

Taking Subordinates Into Confidence

We shall continue with the example of the battle of the Rapido, mentioned earlier. There is sufficient reason to believe that Maj-General Walker was not told of the part his division had to play in the higher scheme of plans. It was essential to press on with this division's attack across the Rapido, as per the US fifth Army plans, to link up with the Anzio beach head and further drive to Rome. Attacking through the valley directly dominated by the formidable enemy defences of Cassino was unsound tactically and from the point of view of human lives, but expedient in the interest of the overall plan and its success. Someone had to undertake this attack. This Gen Clark neither explained to Walker, the Divisional Commander, nor did, Walker make any attempt to know. There was no rapport between the commanders. The Army and the Corps Commanders' decision to continue with this attack was at wide variance with that of the Divisional Commander. The senior generals were dissatisfied with the slow progress of the division's half-hearted efforts. The Divisional Commander thought his senior generals had gone off their minds pushing his division in the certain mouth of gaping death and disaster. Disaster it was; the division was out down and smashed to shambles on the Rapido. There was no heart, no drive, no progress. The miserable failure cost many hundreds of lives.

A Commander should take his subordinates into full confidence and explain the decision in sufficient detail. It is equally the duty of the subordinates to make adequate inquiries to keep themselves apprised of their superiors' decisions, so that they think of their implications and implementation. Knowledge of the senior's mind is a guide to the junior's decisions. Negligence of this responsibility by either party results in either conflicting decisions or poor ones, resulting often in failure.

Integrity And Sense of Values

Take a simple instance. A brigade commander ordering (deliberately through his BM or DQ) a battalion commander to send a company for a fortnight to make a nice little golf-course for him, his sportsman's fancy. Or, say, to send a platoon to do up his garden. Another example: a supply officer being told not to reject fresh supplies because the contractor is closely related to or can directly approach a big brass-hat. And we can have many situations of such a kind. Integrity and sense of values, conscience and ethics, under such conditions, assume paramount importance.

Yet another illustration: Auchinleck's removing two of his army commanders—Cunningham and Rituhe-. Both were chosen by Auchinleck personally to command the Desert Army. Auchinleck cannot be attributed qualities of spitefulness, "fix him" attitude or highhandedness. He had full faith in his chosen commanders. Yet, when the battles went the way they did, he had to decide whether to continue with his army commanders or relieve them. In a most forthright and humane manner Auchinleck relieved both. On both occasions he stemmed the tide and avoided disaster.

Integrity and sense of values are rare and scarce. Unless they are cultivated and adhered to, the resultant decisions will be harmful, dangerous and unwholesome.

Courage

The importance of courage need hardly be delineated. Moral courage is born out of knowledge, education, confidence and will. Gen Eisenhower's decision of areas for landings and their date for "Overlord" in Normandy, in the face of Liegh-Mallory's apprehensions and opposition by weather experts, speaks volumes for his courage. The decision to stick to the already selected landing sites and the one nominating D Day were courageous decisions. On the initial progress of the landings depended success or failure of the beachhead. On the success of the beachhead rested the rest of the Allies' effort and build-up over months and then hinging on one vital decision. With all the overweight of the decision and its consequences if the venture failed, Eisenhower displayed exemplary moral courage in taking that decision.

The battle of Tannenberg in East Prussia during World War I between the Germans and the Russians is another fascinating study of courage influencing decisions. Rennenkampf advancing with his (Russian) army on the East and Samsonov on the South with his, had almost caught Prittwitz's (German) army in a vice. This unexpectedly rapid operation on two sides of his army unnerved Prittwitz and his Chief of Staff, Waldersee. Prittwitz, in fright, decided to withdraw his army beyond the Vistula, but his corps commander, Francois, one of the best German generals of the First World War, disobeyed his army commander's orders and courageously decided to strike Rennenkampf. He brought the latter to a halt on the line of Gumbinen in the east with some bold and violent battles. By then Prittwitz was replaced by Hindenberg with Ludendorf as his chief of staff. Ludendorf repeated courage in deciding to hold Rennenkampf with light forces in the east, withdraw Francois' and other corps of the German army against Samsonov in the south and annihilate the southern threat of his (Samsonov's) army. This was indeed a bold decision. Under the hanging sword of Rennenkampf in the east, Ludendorf wanted to execute his attack on Samsonov in the south at the earliest and, to this end, was hurrying Francois. Francois, ever a step ahead of everyone in boldness, took courage by its scruff and once again decided to disobey Ludendorf, because he wanted to concentrate his corps fully opposite Samsonov. Nor was he to be hustled in spite of danger and its disastrous consequences. Ludendorf almost ran into a nervous breakdown under Rennenkampf's threat and Francois' disobedience. Francois took two more days, with nerves of steel, to launch his attack on Samsonov, on the day of his own choosing. This was courage at its highest in taking such momentous decisions. These decisions by Francois and Ludendorf were the high-water mark of courage. Under similar circumstances, earlier, Prittwitz lost courage and decided to withdraw. Rennenkampf and Samsonov were cautious, apprehensive and beset

with their own administrative difficulties to come to grips with the hemmed-in Germans. Lack of boldness cost them the battle. Tannenberg was a resounding victory for Francois and Ludendorf. Samsonov's army was annihilated and he himself killed.

In the December Indo-Pak war, the decision not to be hustled into a war in spite of provocative criticism, was a courageous one. The results are there to see.

Ingenuity

Ingenuity is the eye for the critical, cultivated and developed by diligent study, anticipation, utilisation of experience and activating intuition. Slim's decision to strike at Meiktila from the south and Macarthur's to land at Inchon are apt examples. Coming in the same category is Manstein's decision to suck two Russian armies (Sixth and Popov's) in his withdrawing net between the Donets and the Dnieper before the third battle of Kharkov, and then by a masterly counter-stroke at the base of the Russian enthusiastic salient. Nearer home, the decision "dash to DACCA" is a fitting example. It is Lawrence's "irrational tenth", his kingfisher hovering aloft.

Readiness To Risk

One of the Israeli Army practices is: "In the attack, risk, risk, risk.". The profession of arms itself is a big risk. Manifestation of this decision may be found in some of their other practices, for example, "when in doubt, hit out"; "If trapped by sudden fire, movement means salvation better than a foxhole". So from the decision to risk, a gamut of doctrines can be evolved. Risk is the foundation of decision-making in the military. Wavel's first desert campaign against the Italians and O'Connor's drive into them are proofs.

Metal Robustness

Prolonged fatigue, isolation, loss of life and material, physical discomfort, enemy success, own setback, confusion, low spirits and loss of command and control severely affect decision making. To maintain the poise required for decision-making, a commander has to develop and employ calm, coolness, patience, pragmatism, confidence, sense of humour and ability to withstand stress and strain.

Staff

An efficient, timely staff work, staff's anticipation, advice and response to the commander's thought process are great assets in decision-making. Woe to the commander blessed with an inefficient, barren staff! Staff is commander's sounding board.

TRAINING IN DECISION-MAKING

There is a greater need of devoting more attention and time to training in

decision-making at all levels of command, not only command levels but also at the level of riflemen, in all our training schedules. A thorough study of this important aspect is essential. Since every soldier has to make decisions, good training in the technique of decision-making will go a long way in ensuring flexibility, speed, success and exploitation.

War-gaming, operational discussions, TEWTS, exercises and conferences provide another training avenue, provided free discussion is encouraged. Stifled opinions are poor material for decision-making. At no stage should this avenue be allowed to degenerate into radical compromise or result in stealing others' ideas. The aim should be to exercise more than one competent brain, benefit from it and bring richness to decision. Others will have the satisfaction of having contributed their bit.

It will be worthwhile emulating the Israeli method of training commanders in decision-making. A unit is gathered at a place for an exercise. A task is given. When the execution is about to start the exercise setting is modified to present opportunities or adversely affect its accomplishment. When the commander reshapes his plan and sets off anew, diversions are created. Then the task itself is changed. Later the unit is switched on to an entirely different role. And so on, for five or six days. Each time conditions are created for quick decisions, tactical, technical and administrative. It is a real grill through which the entire unit goes.

Lastly, the most important avenue is diligent study. There is no short-cut to improving the range and depth of our thinking—by reflection, meditation, introspection, observation, visualisation, reading and exercising our minds. It is prudent to listen to and follow Bismark's "Fools say that they learn from experience; I have always tried to get my experience at the expense of other."

CONCLUSION

Decision-making is a process involving clear definition of the problem, its critical, logical examination, wise evaluation of possibilities with an eye for the critical and finally making a decision ingeniously. The greater the intelligence, knowledge, experience, criticism, objectivity and ingenuity we bring in its examination and evaluation the better the quality of decision.

Examination depends on our thinking, its variety depth and profundity. The three pillars of logical thinking are analysis, synthesis and evaluation. It is by thinking that one gains knowledge, stores experience and mingles the two in reactions and counteractions to evolve ideas, solutions, decisions. A rich, keen mind, reflective and meditative, backed by knowledge and experience will produce quality decisions in quantity and quickly.

Decision-making is built up on three forces, namely, the individual, the group and the situation. Skin and blood over this skeleton are provided by factors like attitudes, rapport, integrity, courage, ingenuity, risking, mental robustness, vision and so on.

It is an important aspect of our profession. We must constantly train ourselves in it. Lives and vital issues depend on decisions. We are at a dangerous game involving lives, innocent, faithful, sincere, undoubting, always looking up to us, leaders. If we don't perfect the art of decision-making we shall, in Sasoon's words, only "manufacture military history regardless of human expense".

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HOW TO ENHANCE THE CAREER PROSPECTS OF THE AVERAGE ARMY OFFICER

LIEUT COLONEL R. V. NAMJOSHI

INTRODUCTION

At the time of choosing the Army as a career, most officers see themselves as potential generals; but the competitive world is a cruel one and generals are few and far between. A majority of us, however, continue to strive and hang on to this vision with a grim determination; for hope is a wonderful thing, and day-dreaming a very pleasant pastime. Having spent the best years of our lives striving and hoping, the cold facts of life suddenly dawn on us one day and we realize that the peak has been reached. The keen, sincere, hardworking officer suddenly undergoes a great transformation. His attitude shows a marked change and he ceases to be effective. As a matter of fact, he is a positive menace. A man who spoils the atmosphere in the whole army. He is frustrated and bitter and, above all, he is feeling terribly insecure. A feeling that is quite natural and is to be expected.

There are now two aspects that merit consideration. The first, is the desirability of allowing this officer to continue in service, and the second is that something has to be done for this officer who was once an asset and has spent the best years of his life serving the Army. Let us first see what is the 'Average Army Officer' and what are his traits !

THE AVERAGE ARMY OFFICER

I THINK it would be fair to assume that the average army officer is one, who will reach his limit as a Lieutenant-Colonel. Depending on whether he is on the plus or minus side of the 'average' he may go one place higher or stay a step lower. But somewhere between Major and Colonel he is going to pack up. Funnily enough, till the time the average officer reaches his limit, he has been either 'high average' or 'above average' and it invariably comes to him as a rather rude shock when he suddenly realises that, on the broader canvas, he is only average. All his life he has

worked hard, has been honest and loyal and has been a truly dedicated soldier. As a matter of fact he has always been an asset and has been one of the biggest contributors to the smooth functioning of the Army. He has been the man who gets things done, the executor. Indeed, without the average army officer, things would not function smoothly at all. Had we all been potential generals nothing would ever move, for we would all be too busy questioning the soundness of the superior's judgment. It, as such, goes without saying, that he has been a very useful member of the team and it seems terribly unfair to suddenly leave him high and dry with nothing to look forward to. To expect him to continue serving with the same gusto and sincerity would be a folly. It would also be folly to expect him to react kindly to being told that he is just average in his present rank and that his chances of going any further are nix. For, the average army officer is, after all, a fairly competent man and his age will not permit him to accept the fact that he does not have the makings of a higher commander. He has no further incentive left now and will turn bitter and frustrated. His dreams of power and glory having been shattered, he is quite liable to be either obstructive or to divert his energies solely to feathering his own nest. After all, if he has nothing else to look forward to in the Army, he may as well start catering for the security of his hearth and home, which he has grossly neglected so far. I do not think he can really be blamed for his attitude, and that being so, I feel it is the moral responsibility of the Army to take steps to better his prospects. He has given his best during the better part of his life and it is unfair to turn him bitter at the end of it.

EMPLOYABILITY

I think experience has shown that the employability of a man who has reached his limit is rather limited in the Army. Also, there is a considerable loss of interest on his part. He is as such, given a type of job that no one else wants, or in certain cases given a second or third tenure of command. In both cases, the officer does just enough work to keep him out of trouble and normally takes the line of least resistance. I dare say, there would be the exceptional case where an officer would continue to do dedicated work; but this would be a very small percentage indeed. Needless to say, such a state of affairs is most undesirable. Apart from promoting inefficiency, this officer is also causing a blockade in posts which could be quite suitably filled, by 'up and coming' youngsters. The answer, I feel, lies in terminating his services honourably. This would be in the interests of all concerned; but before this is done, steps must be taken to resettle him in a way of life which will at least maintain, if not enhance, his present status. This must be done within a couple of years of it being realised that he is not going to rise any further in the Army. For then, being still young, his prospects outside would be much better.

To leave the Army after about twenty years of service and settle down to a civilian way of life, which is even more competitive, is a fairly difficult

task. First, except for officers from the more technical arms, very few have the qualifications required for landing a lucrative job, and secondly, if one does, there has to be a complete change of attitude. This is difficult for a majority of officers, whose ideas have become reasonably set by now. I would say, there are three options open. The first would be to seek a vocation where conditions are reasonably similar to those in the Army. I imply organisations like the BSF, the CRP, the ITBF and so on. The second option would be to go in for something like farming or poultry or some such thing where one is one's own boss. The third option would be to enter the private sector. In this case, there may have to be a complete reorientation of values. A task which is difficult, but having learnt to adapt one's self to various changing situations, it should be possible over a period of time.

POSITIVE STEPS

In determining the various actions that are required to be taken in order to improve subsequent career prospects, I feel the responsibility lies with two parties. One is the individual himself and the other, with the Government or Army authorities. I shall deal with these responsibilities separately.

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL OFFICER

The prime responsibility of the average army officer lies in indulging in a certain amount of self-analysis and being very frank in assessing one's own potential and limitations. A certain amount of honest soul-searching should be able to lead one to a reasonably accurate assessment of one's future prospects in the Army. There is, of course, that element of chance which can tip the scales, but I do not feel one can pay too much importance to it. It is often very difficult to face facts and accept defeat, but if one is reasonably convinced the chances are that one has reached one's limit, one would be wise to see the writing on the wall and take certain positive steps:

- (a) The first thing he must then do is to decide on what vocation he would like to follow. This decision should be governed by his aptitude and his leanings.
- (b) Having decided on the vocation, he must, in his own time, start making a detailed study of the subject and start mentally conditioning himself to the way of life he is about to embark on.
- (c) Having made a study and conditioned himself, he must establish the necessary contacts and put in his papers seeking his release from the Army at the appropriate time. This will have to be rather well timed.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF GOVERNMENT-ARMY

- (a) It should be quite apparent to the Military Secretary's Branch as

to which officer is reaching his limit. Having realised this they should promptly inform the officer as to his likely career prospects and ask him for his choice of vocation.

(b) They should then make arrangements to obtain a vacancy for him on a course which will gear him for the future, or, should this not be possible, arrangements should be made to post him to a place where he can obtain these facilities privately.

(c) They should ask him for the date he seeks release from the Army and ensure that the necessary formalities are completed in time.

(d) The period during which the outgoing officer is most vulnerable is between the time he leaves and the time it takes him to settle down. It must as such be ensured that whatever financial benefits have accrued to the officer by way of DSOP, gratuity or commutation are made available to him promptly on the day of his release.

(e) There is plenty of waste land available in this country and I see no reason why it should not be possible for the Government to allot 15 to 20 acres to an officer who is desirous of going into agriculture. He could also be provided the facility of acquiring a tractor and irrigation arrangements on easy instalments. It could also be ensured that his produce is purchased by our own supply organisation.

(f) In private sector enterprise, the Government could ensure that a certain percentage of vacancies in the executive cadre are made available to service officers.

(g) In the Para Military Forces, the biggest handicap a service officer faces today is his loss of seniority. He suddenly finds himself a subordinate to some one with half his service and experience. This could very easily be regularised by Government.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I would say that the average army officer, by virtue of his experience, grooming and background can become a very effective pillar of society, if he is provided the right opportunities. Guidance and assistance at the right time would benefit many such officers. And not only the officer, the Army and the country too would stand to gain. Above all, you will have prevented him from ending up frustrated and bitter and he will continue to strive and may be—even see visions !

THE MILITARY IMPACT OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

LIEUT COLONEL A.K. MINOCHA

In dealing with the military impact of satellite communications, it is presumed that the reader has a basic understanding of the theory of propagation of radio waves and the techniques of radio communication existing in our country today. It is the inherent weaknesses in any system, coupled with the increased requirements of the user that has led to better systems being evolved. Long-distance communications with little or no interference and the ability to derive several channels over a single system would seem to be the answer to most of the problems of communications, whether the user be an army man or anyone else and whether he be in this country or anywhere else. To achieve this aim, various systems have been evolved which are in use today, such as HF radio using sky wave propagation, and trojoscatter, radio relay including microwave and the use of land line communications including submarine cables. Each of these systems has certain obvious inherent limitations which need no elaboration.

The prediction of using a synchronous satellite to overcome some of the problems of communications was the brainwave of a British scientist, AC Clarke, in 1945, which became a reality in 1957 when the Russians launched the first satellite. Before going into the military impact of satellite communications, it would be worthwhile to briefly examine the technique employed in the use of satellites as a means to improved communications.

SATELLITE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

WE are quite familiar with radio relay as a means of communications and with the use of relay stations placed at appropriate distances between the end terminals to provide longer range. To visualise a satellite system, if a relay station is placed a few miles above the ground level instead of on the ground, the terminal stations would get a proper line of sight through this relay and would simultaneously eliminate the losses that would occur due to reflection, refraction and diffraction when the radio waves travel in close proximity of the earth's surface. An added

advantage would be that, not only would the two original terminal stations be able to use this relay on repeater but perhaps several other stations would be able to make use of the same repeater to add range to their chain. It is however not possible to keep this relay on repeater station a few miles above the ground, hence it is placed deeper into space when it becomes either a stationary or orbiting satellite.

To meet the requirements of a repeater station, that is to receive, amplify and retransmit radio signals, a satellite must comprise the following:—

- (a) Receivers.
- (b) Amplifiers.
- (c) Transmitters.
- (d) Antennas.
- (e) Power supply
- (f) Systems for stabilisation.
- (g) Systems for temperature control.

The earth stations must likewise comprise the following :—

- (a) Receivers.
- (b) Transmitters.
- (c) Antennas.
- (d) Tracking system and servo to keep the antenna pointed at the satellite.
- (e) Feed system to isolate the send and receive paths; and the tracking and communication signals.
- (f) A system for multichannelling.
- (g) Power supply.

In conjunction with the earth stations, satellites enable simultaneous communication on a number of channels to provide telephone, telegraph, television, data and facsimile over a long range. Further, they provide multiple access in that, with the help of synchronous satellites, all countries which have earth stations within the line of sight of a satellite can communicate with each other. Communications are of a high quality and cover a wide range such as high speed transmission of computer data, transmission of radio photos, television on print using facsimile, maritime communications and communication for space programmes such as moon landings.

WEAPON CONTROL

A satellite placed in orbit over an appropriate latitude can present great potential to the military user. Military application can broadly be divided into the following:—

- (a) Communications.
- (b) Surveillance.
- (c) Navigation.
- (d) Weapon control.

Communications. This aspect is perhaps the most important application of satellites for the defence services. Communications could either be static or mobile, the former covering the strategic requirement, whereas the latter, tactical.

(a) *Static communications.* A more feasible proposition would be the lining of circuits out of a national communication system, to meet the requirement of both speed and traffic clearance between Army Headquarters and Commands and other static formations. The reliability of such circuits can hardly be emphasised. However, the decision to use a synchronous satellite or otherwise will be dependent on the enemy's capability and whether it will be considered worthwhile for the enemy to take counter-measures.

(b) *Tactical communications.* A major consideration for the use of satellites for forward area communications is the size, weight and concealability of earth stations. A series of low altitude satellites would provide a higher degree of security of communications but would make the earth stations bulky in view of the requirement of tracking facilities.

Surveillance. This would vary from heat detecting devices to warn of the launching of rockets to the conventional photography using cameras capable of detecting objects one-metre-square, on the ground. Linked with a fast means of interpreting, correlating and disseminating, an efficient system of battlefield surveillance could be evolved. A low-altitude random-phased satellite system would perhaps be more effective than a synchronous satellite due to the possible detection and neutralisation of the latter by the enemy.

Navigation. Satellites as aids to navigation are already being fully utilised in the Western countries and could effectively be used by the armed forces in our country. Due consideration must however be given to the pay-off in such utilisation vis-a-vis the cost in terms of efficiency and reliability. The same would be applicable to meteorological satellites.

Weapon control. This would cover two aspects, guidance and correction, in that a satellite could either be used as a reference point for a guided weapon or, in a way similar to surveillance systems, a satellite could be programmed to give automatic correction to long-range missiles.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

The low-altitude satellite is much less vulnerable to enemy action than the synchronous satellite and would therefore prove more useful in its military

application. The possibility of enemy electronic warfare measures must however be taken into consideration, for they could result in any of the following :—

- (a) *Destruction.* Physical destruction may perhaps be an expensive proposition; however, electronic destruction by “capturing” a satellite and commanding it to close down or move to a different location is well within the means of the enemy.
- (b) *Interception.* Although expensive, it is well within the means of our potential enemies on our borders to establish intercept stations and thus pick up transmissions made via satellites. The use of highly directive antennas may not be the answer to the problem but perhaps the use of more than one satellite, well spaced out, coupled with spectrum or channel switching, may largely offset this disadvantage.
- (c) *Interference.* This can be achieved by either jamming the channel or by introducing noise in it. This again can be offset by channel or spectrum switching and the use of more than one satellite with random allocation.

CONCLUSION

Satellites have a tremendous potential in their military application, particularly for the provision of communications. Unfortunately, the launching of satellites is an expensive proposition as the most important thing to remember is that, once put into orbit, a satellite cannot be touched again. It must therefore have very high reliability and “proven” electronics. To cater for such foreseen difficulties in meeting the expense, the International Telecommunication Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT) was formed. India is a member of this organisation. A few ground stations have been or are being set up in India by the Atomic Energy Commission and very soon it will be possible for us to communicate via satellite in India. The armed forces would perhaps get a proportionate share of channels but these would be very limited and nowhere near the overall requirement to make one feel the impact. The answer thus lies in launching own satellites and not depending on the USA or USSR. It is hard to say when this would be possible but certainly in the not too distant future.

WEAPONS OF WAR IN ANCIENT INDIA

GROUP CAPTAIN N. N. DHIR, VSM

AN area of Indology which has received scant attention from research scholars is the science and art of war in ancient India. The main reason for this apparent neglect is paucity of adequate material on the subject. There is also the recurrent difficulty in distinguishing what is historically correct and what is literary fantasy. The mysterious and magical weapons mentioned in the Ramayana and Mahabharata like the *Mohanstra*, the *Gandharvastra* and, most formidable of all, the *Brahmastra*, slaying thousands at a blow, cannot but be considered the products of the poet's imagination. In this article, we shall endeavour to carry out a realistic survey of the entire range of weaponry available to our remote ancestors.

According to the oldest tradition, the theory and technique of warfare were enunciated elaborately in *Dhanurveda*, an *upaveda* or auxiliary text traditionally attached to *Yajurveda*. Unfortunately, no authoritative or complete version of this treatise has come down to us. Although some copies of a booklet entitled *Dhanurveda Samhita* are currently extant, it is difficult to vouch for their authenticity. In ancient India, proficiency in the use of weapons of war was an essential requirement, especially for the young kshatriyas. Comprehensive text books were composed on the subject by great masters like Brahaspati, Shukra, Vishwamitra, Vasishtha and many others, each expounding one or more aspects of the great art. Most of these works are not now available. Quite possibly, with advances in technology, their utility had decreased and they finally perished in the holocaust following early Muslim invasions. Only fragments have survived in later works like *Kamandakiya Nitisar*, *Veer Chintamani*, *Vridhha Sharngadhara*, *Yudhha Jayarnava*, *Yukti Kalpataru* etc.

POPULAR SUBJECTS

There is considerable evidence that the science and art of war were popular subjects of study at ancient Indian universities such as Takshashila and Nalanda. Young students of the Brahman and kshatriya castes, including many scions of noble families, strove hard to master the intricacies of *Dhanurveda*. At the time of the annual convocations, tournaments and competitions were held during which the young *snatakas* or graduates showed their paces in the use of different weapons. They were keenly watched by representatives and agents of the many principalities and *janapadas* (republics) of the sub-continent, who made them offers of employment on behalf of their governments.

It appears that there were wide differences in the equipment and tactical conceptions between the three tiers of the profession—aristocrats of the kshatriya caste, popular levies and brigands of the jungle tribes. As is evident from its very nomenclature, war in India, as elsewhere in those days, was dominated by the bow and arrow. In Hindu mythology, every major god is credited with having a bow of his own, apart from other weapons. Thus the three main *divya* or divine bows were the *Sharnga*, the bow of Vishnu, the *Pariveeta*, the bow of Brahma, and the *Pinaka*, the bow of Shiva. The bow of Indra was the *Shakra Dhanusha*, a name also for the rainbow. The *Gandeeva*, another divine bow, was acquired by Arjuna, the hero of Mahabharata, through various godly agencies. The *Gandeeva* is probably the most celebrated weapon in the Indian mythology.


The *Agni Purana*, which is a veritable encyclopaedia of ancient Indian lore, presents some rather disjointed segments of *Dhanurveda*. It mentions five different types of war, classified, according to the weapons used—*yantra mukta*, the war in which the weapons used were propelled mechanically; *pani mukta*, that in which the weapons used were released by hand; *mukta sandharita*, wherein such weapons were used as returned to the thrower, like the *Chakra* or the boomerang; and *amukta* or close combat, in which the weapons used were retained by the warrior during the fight, like the sword, the mace, etc. Finally, there was the *niyudhha* or *bahu yudhha* which signified unarmed combat.

The general terms used for all types of weapons were *praharnam* and *ayudha*. A division of weapons generally accepted classified them as *shastra* and *astra*, the former indicating personal arms retained during combat and the latter missiles or weapons that were released or thrown at adversaries. The *Arthashastra* divides implements of war into four categories: *yantra*, engines or machines of war; *ayudha* the arms proper; *avarana*, defensive armour and shields; and *upakarna* or other types of war equipment.


CHIEF WEAPON

From the dimmest period of the fourth millenia B.C. until the nineteenth century A.D., the bow was the chief weapon in India. There were many types of bows and arrows, *Amarakosha*, the Sanskrit thesaurus, listing no fewer than seven names for the bow and fourteen for the arrow. The earliest bows were made of wood, usually bamboo which was reasonably strong and flexible. Later, a composite bow was developed, made of metal, horn and wood, with a string of hemp, silk, hide or sinew. The arrow was of reed or wood, feathered, and tipped with horn, bone, wood or metal, in a variety of shapes. Kautilya in his *Arthashastra*, mentions the three principal types of bows: the *Karmuka*, made from palmyra, the *kodanda*, made of wood, and the *Druma*, made of horn. He also describes six types of bow strings. Arrows were made in a variety of shapes and sizes, the barbed pike being sometimes shaped like a crescent (*ardha chandra*), like a needly (*suchi mukha*),

Ancient Weapons




Bows



Arrows

L & R - Anupala, Ardha Chandra, Shiela
Kakara and Vaidanta



Lance Heads




Shastri





Prashpad



Trident



Swords



Axes and Maces

Sketches by the Author

like a saw (*ara mukha*) or even like a cow's beak (*kaka tunda*). Often more than one arrow was released at the same time, sometimes as many as five. Soldiers of taste, and distinction had their arrows inscribed with their names or monograms.

A special characteristic of archery was its use by all the four components of the field force or *chaturingini sena*: the military chariots, the elephant corps, the cavalry and the infantry. The length of bows varied a great deal. Those used by the charioteers were comparatively small but Kautilya also describes the *maheshwasa*, a gigantic bow with a length of over seven feet. It was probably this weapon which was used by Porus's soldiers against Alexander's troops. Arrian, Alexander's military biographer, describes this bow as the standard equipment of the Indian infantry of the time: "Their arrows are a little less than three cubits long and nothing can stand one shot by an Indian archer, neither shield nor breastplate." Unfortunately, heavy rain rendered these archers all but useless against Alexander's force. Ancient Indian history is replete with the exploits of Hindu archers. In *Raghuvansha*, Kalidasa describes an archer in action. He was so quick in operation that it was impossible to see him putting his hand in the quiver. To an observer, it seemed that the arrows flying from the bow were produced by the bow string itself, as it were. Exceptionally skilled archers were trained to be *savyasachi* or ambidexterous, capable of pulling the string with the left hand as well. Various texts outline different methods of shooting arrows on to the targets. *Vaisishtha Dhanurveda* prescribes three methods, while *Agni Purana* describes six variations. *Veer Chintamani* links the process of shooting arrows with the progressive stages of *pranayama*. It is a great pity that India, which was possibly the land where archery originated, has discarded it even as a sport. With its reintroduction in the Olympics, I feel serious thought should be given to the revival of archery in our country. I have no doubt it will rapidly gain popularity.

VARIETIES OF SWORDS

Of the personal arms in olden times, the sword was naturally pre-eminent. According to early Arab writers, Indian swords were renowned for their craftsmanship, different regions specialising in the manufacture of different types. Kautilya mentions three varieties: the *nistrinsha*, incurved with the cutting edge on the inner side, the precursor of the modern kukri; the *mandalagra*, a straight sword with a leaf-shaped head; and the *asiyashti*, a long slender sword, rather like the European rapier. The *Amarakosha* mentions some more varieties. The *rishti* was a double-edged sword; the *kauksheyaka* was the forerunner of the scimitar. The *Chandraghasa*, also the name of Ravana's sword, must have been a huge and heavy weapon. The *kripana* was a short sword. The *eelee* and *karvalika* were daggers. So also was *shastri*, used in hand-to-hand fighting. With the passage of time, an infinite variety developed in swords: straight and curved, short and long, single-edged and double-edged, broad-bladed and narrow-bladed. The

hilts of the ancient swords were made of rhinoceros or buffalo horn or ivory. The earlier scabbards were made of leather. Swordsmanship was raised to the level of a fine accomplishment. The *Mahabharata* mentions twenty-one special movements of the sword while the *Agni Purana* lists as many as thirty-two combat postures with the weapon.

Numerous types of spear and javelin existed in ancient India. The Indian spear was probably never as long as the Macedonian sarissa or the seventeenth century European pike. Kautilya mentions eleven popular weapons with piercing points. The general name for the series was *prasa*, literally to throw. It was a spear with a long bamboo or wooden shaft, and a leaf-shaped blade with a medial rib. This weapon was popular with the cavalry and the elephant corps. The *shakti* was four cubits long, made entirely of metal, with the tip shaped like the *karir* leaf and the head like a cow's udder. The *kunta* was a lance or barbed dart, a special type of which had six edges and was a popular weapon with horsemen. The *hataka* was similar to the *kunta* but had only a three-edged tip. The *sula* was a lance of variable length but a single point. According to another commentator, the *sula* was like the present-day *barchha*, with a square, pentagonal or octagonal long blade. The *tomara*, a weapon traditionally associated with *Agni Deva*, was four to five cubits long and had an arrow-shaped tip. The *varahakarana*, as the name implies, was a *prasa* with its tip shaped like the boar's ear. Then there was the *kanaya*, an all-metal weapon about eighteen inches long, with a trident at each end and a grip in the middle. The *karpana* was a missile-like weapon, light in weight and released by hand. And, finally, Kautilya mentions in this series, the *trasika*, an all-metal weapon of the size of *prasa*, with a tuft at one end.

BATTLE AXE

The *Arthashastra* next enumerates razor-edged weapons. The *parashu* or battle axe, about two feet in length, had an all-metal body. It was the weapon of the celebrated mythical warrior, Parashurama, who is reputed to have carried out his terrible vow of exterminating the kshatriya race. In historical times, Samudragupta, the Maurya emperor, was known as *Krtanta parashu*, Wielder of the Battle-axe of Death. There were many variations of the weapon; the *pattasha* was an axe with a trident at the upper end. The other varieties of the weapon mentioned are the *swadhiti* and the *parashwadha*. A little different in utilisation were the *kuddala* or spade, a nomenclature that persists even today, the *kratacha* or saw and the *kandachhedana*, probably a huge axe used for felling trees.

Another razor-edged weapon was the *chakra*, the discus or quoit, the special weapon of Vishnu and his incarnation Krishna. It was of two types, according to the cutting edge which could be plain or serrated. It had diagonal bars in the middle and pointed projections on the periphery, which were sharp as razor blades. In recent times, it was to become one of the

standard arms of the Akali Sikhs. In practised hands, it could sever the enemy's neck at a distance of sixty to a hundred yards.

Rather strangely, Kautilya makes no mention of the club-type weapons. The *gada*, or mace was another weapon of Vishnu, and also of Hanuman and Bhima. The *gada* was a heavy weapon, used in hand-to-hand fighting. It had a large, globular head attached to a metal rod. The head was plain, petalled or studded with pointed iron pikes. The *mudgara* was rather like a mallet, with a short, round handle and a heavy hitting portion. Another variety was the *laguda*, a term which could also mean a special type of cudgel. We might also mention the *vajra*, the mythical weapon of Indra which became a synonym for heavy throwing weapons, destructive as a thunderbolt.

There has been a controversy among scholars about knowledge of fire-arms in ancient India. It has been contended that gunpowder was invented and used in India and that muskets and cannons were in common use. One has to agree with Basham that it is difficult to subscribe to such a view. If our ancestors did have such weapons, Greek, Arab or Chinese visitors would certainly have mentioned the fact. However, incendiarism was an important aspect of Warfare in ancient India. There were various types of *agneya astra* or *agni bana*, arrows which had combustible heads. Three recipes have been mentioned, the *agni dharana*, the *kshepyo-agni-yoga* and the *vishwas ghati*. The first two were highly inflammable arrow heads which could not be easily extinguished, while the last-named was virtually a bomb with the bursting of which fragments of metal were strewn in all directions. The *nala dipika* or rocket was an iron tube, about a foot long and an inch in diameter. It was fixed to a bamboo stick and had a range of about one thousand yards. It was almost as dangerous to the man who fired it as to the enemy, but if, with luck, it exploded on impact, it would frighten raw troops, cause a stampede by horses or start a fire in the enemy ranks.

Frequent mention is made in Sanskrit texts of the *pasha* or noose. The *Agni Purana* gives details of how a *pasha* is to be made and how it is used by a horseman to capture an adversary. A variety of the *pasha* seems to have been operated like the lasso used on American ranches.

Shields were carried by all soldiers except the archers or the very poor levies. They were generally made of the hides of oxen, rhinoceri or tigers. Other types were made of bamboo or matted creeper. They varied much in length, sometimes covering the entire body. The better ones were, decorated with State or family emblems. The warriors depicted in early sculpture are only lightly defended with armour. Kautilya enumerates the helmet, the neck-guard, the cuirass, the robe, the court of mail, the breastplate and the thigh-guard in this connection. Only the rich could afford full body armour. Among the poor, wadded coats of quilted cotton were in general use.

SIEGE ARTILLERY

Ancient Indians possessed the prevalent equipment of siege artillery—ballistae, battering rams, catapults and other siege engines. The *Arthashastra* describes a large number of machines the main purpose of which was to throw large quantities of stones and other such missiles on the enemy forces. Only sketchy descriptions of these engines of war have been given by commentators from which it is difficult to deduce an exact idea of their shape, size and functions. Thus the *sarvatobhadra* was shaped like the wheel of a bullock cart. It was placed on the rampart and used to rain stones on the storming troops. The *jamdagnya*, the shape of which is not described, shot arrows on all sides. The *bahumukha* was a specially designed apartment or niche for archers with many holes through which they could shoot arrows on various sides while themselves enjoying comparative immunity. Another machine mentioned by Kautilya was the *Vishwasghatin*, described above as an explosive bomb, but also the name of an engine of war. This was a beam placed crosswise outside the rampart, a sort of booby trap which when touched would fall on the enemy and destroy him. Next is described the *sanghati*, a "fire arm" fixed on a high wooden pedestal, using which it was possible to set fire to towers and turrets. The *parjanya* was a water machine, a device for putting out fires. According to another view, however, it was a machine, about fifty feet long, placed on the ramparts, with an automatic firing device, which operated on the approach of the enemy and destroyed him. The *bahuyantra* was half the size of the *parjanya*. On a switch being operated, it fell on the enemy. The *urdhwabahu*, which was the same size as the *bahuyantra*, had the appearance of a pillar and, with the release of a mechanism, fell on the enemy, thereby slaying him. The *ardhabahu* was a smaller version of the machine just described. These were the *sthira yantras* or stationary machines.

Kautilya then enumerates the mobile machines. One of these was the *panchalika*, a wooden plank thickly studded with iron nails and placed in the moat to obstruct the enemy. The *devadanda*, a large beam placed on the wall was used apparently for being hurled down like a bolt from the blue. The *sukarika* was a leather bag, stuffed with cotton, wool etc and shaped like a pig. It was used to prevent the storming of the walls. The *musala yashti* was a pike made of khadira wood. The *hastivaraka* was a bar with multi-pronged pikes used for striking down advancing elephants. The *talavrantika* was a *vata chakra* which produced a strong wind and raised dust. The *asphatima* was a catapult with four leather-covered pillars. The *utpatima*, on the other hand, appears to have been a huge wrench for pulling down pillars. The *udghatima* was a hammer-shaped machine. According to one scholar, the last three weapons were so devised as to burst or open or uproot automatically. The *shataghni* or hundred-slayer was a big pillar-like structure, studded with large, long nails, with a cart-wheel at one end. It was placed on the fort wall and hurled down on the enemy as he approached to scale the wall. As

mentioned earlier, our knowledge of these war machines is very limited. It is clear, however, that the various engines and contrivances were brought into play alike by the besieger and the besieged and their principal use was in pelting stones, spears, arrows, boiling oil and pots of fire on the other party.

This brief survey should show that the ancient Indian weapons were at least as well advanced as those anywhere else in the contemporary world. While it is true that no scientific researcher can take seriously the claim of some orthodox scholars that all human knowledge, including the latest discoveries of our technological era, have their basis in the Hindu scriptures, the tendency of the earlier Western scholars to denigrate the achievements of ancient Indians and pretend that the history of India really started with the Mughal Empire is certainly worthy of condemnation. A standard text book on the history of warfare, beautifully, produced and exhaustively illustrated, completely ignores the progress of military science in the Hindu period of Indian history. It is for this reason that I feel the research fraternity should take up the challenging task of reconstructing *Dhanurveda*, the theory and technique of war in ancient India.

PAKISTAN FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS

A REVIEW ARTICLE*

B.L. SHARMA

GENERAL Yahya Khan brought about the fall of Pakistan, but it was General Ayub Khan who prepared the ground for it. From 1958 to 1969 he was the helmsman, and by the time he began his adventure in Kashmir in 1965, he had not only transformed conditions at home, assuming a father image as it were, but also won for his country a position which began to command some attention and respect in the comity of nations. True, he had already made a few blunders and gathered round himself many a man of straw who acted according to his bidding. Nevertheless, he had acquired a high stature among his people. Perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to say that no other head of State except Jinnah had done so much for Pakistan, for after all Jinnah was responsible only for bringing about the birth of Pakistan, having little time and much less energy, because of his failing health, to bring up the new State. That task, as it happened was left to General Ayub Khan.

Unfortunately it was also during his regime that decay set in and Pakistan began to go down the slippery slope. All the good work that he did began to be swallowed up in the shifting sands of Economic Forces, Political intrigue and corruption. To understand what happened in Pakistan in 1971, it is therefore necessary to study the conflict of forces which were generated during his presidency. This is what Herbert Feldman has done in his latest book *From Crisis To Crisis: Pakistan 1962-1969**. The book is the sequel to the author's *Revolution in Pakistan, 1967* which dealt with Ayub Khan's martial law regime. The present book studies the politics and administration of Pakistan under the Constitution introduced by Ayub Khan in 1962. A third volume, covering events after the reinstatement of martial law in March 1969, is planned.

Ayub Khan's Constitution by which Pakistan was governed from 8 June 1962 to 25 March 1969 was Authoritarian and proved to be democratic in name rather than in fact. With the head of the State there reposed a wide range of executive powers on the exercise of which there was no restraint whatsoever and "it was this great quantum of authority, on the retention of

*From crisis to crisis : Pakistan 1962-69, By Herbert Feldman, Oxford University Press, London, 1972, pp. 340, Price £ 5.50.

which Ayub Khan was so eagerly bent, that contributed much to his ultimate undoing." In bare fact, the nation had been asked to accept a Constitution in which neither the President nor the Ministers chosen by him were responsible to the National Assembly, itself a diminutive body, bearing in mind that it represented a nation of about one hundred million persons. It comprised only 156 members of whom six were women elected to seats reserved for them. This chamber was elected not by direct voting on the basis of universal adult suffrage, but by an Electoral College consisting of eighty thousand persons, themselves elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage, and divided equally between the two Provinces. These eighty thousand persons were otherwise known as Basic Democrats and it was in this capacity that they provided the elected membership of those bodies which carried on, at various levels, the local government of the country. Basic Democrats also had other responsibilities. They provided the members of the Conciliation Courts for settling minor disputes between individuals and for dealing with disputes relating to marriage and divorce among Muslims in accordance with the Family Laws Ordinance. They were directly concerned with the rural works programme and sometimes with the local distribution of foodgrains and other necessities when there was shortage or disaster.

It was their dual character, as the author explains, by which membership of the Electoral College and that of local government bodies were combined, which made possible the purchase and retention of their allegiance. "Thus, as time passed, it was generally believed in Pakistan that the Basic Democrats had, for the most part, been thoroughly corrupted by Ayub Khan and his political henchmen". In the presidential election of 1965, no fewer than 28,000 out of 80,000 Basic Democrats voted against Ayub Khan and in favour of Fatima Jinnah, who was the combined opposition Parties' candidate. It is also said that but for electoral gerrymandering on that occasion the number who voted for Miss Jinnah would have been higher.

Not only was the National Assembly small in itself; its powers were considerably limited, especially in relation to financial matters. Over national expenditure it had no control whatever, except with respect to what was called a "new expenditure", and this represented by far the minor aspect of the subject. In respect of voting money supplies, although a budget was presented to the Assembly and members could criticise it as they might wish, there was no power to refuse.

After giving the salient features of the Constitution, Feldman analyses Ayub's attitude to the solution of his country's problems. This was based on a combination of "solid common sense allied to a set of notions conspicuous for their simplistic naivete". He could be wise enough on clear-cut issues and could see his way towards necessary and practical ends as these revealed themselves, "But as soon as he strayed into the less substantial realms of theory and projection, his grip faltered and he was liable to make himself look

foolish". In essence he had shown himself to be a conciliator, a man ready to compromise and come to terms with any movement, organization or individual, even within the country itself, wherever there was a genuine point of view and the courage to pursue it. This is not to say that "anyone visited with his displeasure might not be made to feel its sting, but that had more to do with a sensitive vanity and an easily provoked feeling of injured pride."

This resilience explains why some of the reforms initiated by him during the Martial Law Administration were not implemented. Open defiance on the part of the students led to a suspension of many of the proposed reforms in education. The recommendations of the Commission on Company Law remained a dead letter. His Land Reforms, which applied only to West-Pakistan, were far less effective in their scope than insistent publicity had claimed and, in the case of certain influential landlords, their effect had been greatly mitigated. At the same time there were important social measures, instituted by Ayub Khan, and opposed in many orthodox quarters, with which he had persevered. Conspicuous among them was the Ordinance on Muslim Family Laws which had liberated many Pakistani women from the unfair exercise of certain Islamic Institutions, notably plural marriage and divorce by *Talaq*. Similar things can be said about his proposal for a country-wide movement to encourage family planning and the wise limitation of families. He clearly saw, and had more than once remarked to the effect, that without some limitation on population growth, all economic progress would be nullified.

Not that some reckless promises were not made. There was a country-wide food drive that was to bring self-sufficiency in foodgrains within two years. Early in 1961 a pilot project was launched to abolish beggary. Not long after this the Finance Minister declared that within two years Pakistan would become self-sufficient in the manufacture of sugar, which was still being imported when Ayub gave up the office of President in March 1969, by which time it was on ration. Lieut.-General Burki expressed the view that by the end of the Second Five Year Plan, i.e. by June 1965, there would be medical aid for all in Pakistan and that no tuberculosis or malaria would exist.

However, in the economic field considerable growth was noticed. In 1949-50 the G.N.P. was Rs. 2,446.6 crores based on constant factor cost in 1959-60. On the same basis, the G.N.P. for 1958-59 was Rs. 3,014.4 crores, an advance of Rs. 567.6 crores; for 1967-68, the G.N.P. was Rs. 4,828.0 crores, an advance of Rs. 1,813.6 crores. On this basis, therefore, the rate of economic growth was higher during Ayub Khan's Administration than before. However, between 1949-50 and 1967-68, the population increased by forty-three million so that the per capita income, based on the same constant factors, only grew from Rs. 311 to Rs. 397. Remarkable headway was made in the manufacture of mill-made cotton cloth, jute goods, paper and paper

board, art silk and rayon, sugar, vegetable cooking oils, cement and chemical fertilizers.

No less marked was the extension of the agricultural infrastructure, due mostly to the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty with India in 1960. This led to a vast programme of dam, barrage and canal construction, the completion of the Mangla Dam, and the initiation of the even greater Tarbela Dam. In addition, a vast increase in the availability of electrical power carried by new transmission systems to thousands of villages made possible the beginning of the tubewell schemes known as SCARP (Salinity Control and Reclamation Project).

"One of the principal sources of public discontent, leading ultimately to Ayub Khan's political defeat, lay in the uncontrolled and apparently uncontrollable burden of rising prices. Corruption, nepotism, bureaucratic tyranny and the absence of direct, political representation certainly had their influence on the public mind, but the effect of rising prices hurt most. Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto might proclaim, as he did when he was Ayub Khan's Foreign Minister, that the people of Pakistan would eat grass rather than submit to pressures designed to thwart their pursuit of just claims and inalienable rights, but however noble these motives, grass is a poor diet, and there was no reason to suppose that the people of Pakistan would accept it in order to keep Ayub Khan in office."

"Robber barons" were thriving. Dr. Mahbubul Huq, Chief Economist in the Planning Division of the Government of Pakistan, revealed in April 1968 that 66 per cent of all industrial projects, 97 per cent of all insurance funds and 80 per cent of all bank deposits were in the control of some twenty families.

Everything might still have been well, had Ayub resisted the temptation of meddling in Kashmir in 1965. Feldman gives reasons which seem to have influenced him in planning for the creation of unrest in Kashmir, leading to an invasion with a view to acquisition. These are briefly:

- (1) His convincing victory in the presidential election of January 1965 appeared to have armed him with a clear mandate, and he had every reason to suppose that such a policy would have the approval of Pakistan, and in particular of West Pakistan.
- (2) The creation of a China-Indonesia-Pakistan Axis.
- (3) The poor performance of Indian troops against China in 1962.
- (4) His extensive tours of foreign countries during the months preceding September 1965 had enabled him to present Pakistan's case on Kashmir. In Particular, he was encouraged by China.
- (5) The failure of his talks with Sheikh Abdullah and the subsequent

application of Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution to Kashmir.

- (6) The Hazratbal incident in Kashmir.
- (7) A belief that all the circumstances, including the respective past performances of Pakistani and Indian troops in Kashmir, favoured the possibility of a swift *Fait Accompli*.
- (8) A belief that irrespective of the military pressures which Pakistan might exert in the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government would not, in order to relieve these pressures, undertake various risks involved in an advance across the international boundary that divided India and Pakistan in the Punjab or elsewhere.

To all these reasons Ayub must have also added political and economic weaknesses prevailing in India at the time. As well as the belief which many foreigners held, namely that India under Nehru was quite different from India under Shastri.

Feldman has thrown new light on Ayub's fear of the part which Afghanistan might have played, had Indo-Pakistan hostilities continued. According to him it seems probable that had India broken into Lahore, fanning north, south and west, Afghanistan would have been in Peshawar first. But in that case, he believes, pressures might then have been put on Afghanistan not to extend the conflict and add further complications to its international nature. "This is possible, but what is very certain is the chance that Pakistan might have found itself fighting on two fronts". In January 1966, when explaining the Tashkent policy to a privately conducted meeting of businessmen in Karachi, reveals the author, Ayub Khan said that one reason for calling off the fight was that Afghanistan was preparing to attack. A critic may ask whether there was any substance in such a view or whether Ayub was only trying to sell the Tashkent agreement. In this reviewer's view, possibly the latter, for though India's crossing the International border came to Pakistan as a nasty surprise, even Ayub could not be so simple-minded as to imagine that once India broke into Lahore, it would have no difficulty in fanning north, south and west. Nevertheless one has to agree with Feldman that in Kashmir Ayub gambled and lost.

He also considers the Tashkent Declaration as "one of the seeds of Ayub Khan's later destruction". It was, he argues, the real and precipitating cause of his quarrel with Bhutto, one of the principal leaders in the movement resulting in Ayub Khan's fall from power and loss of office. It is a moot point whether it was the Tashkent agreement which brought about Ayub's fall or Bhutto who, by stabbing his chief in the back, tried to exploit the agreement to further his own political ambitions, instead of standing by the side of his chief in explaining and justifying its provisions to the people of Pakistan.

After Tashkent things began to go from bad to worse. Already Ayub had been manipulating his own Constitution, apart from amending it frequently. For the first time the word 'secession' was used in East Pakistan. Opposition to the Government grew among students and workers, as did corruption in the administration. Politicians resented the absence of a responsible executive and an elected legislature. A significant commentary on the relations between the two wings of Pakistan is provided by the fact that although fighting was on the West Pakistan border, only 451 persons were detained, whereas in East Pakistan, where there was no fighting, 1,840 persons were detained. In a television interview at Rawalpindi on 14 August 1967, Ayub himself expressed the view that the only link between the two provinces lay in the fact that the Governor of each of them was appointed by the Centre. "Remove him (the Governor) and you have two countries straight away."

"Ayub Khan failed as explicitly in East Pakistan, as in West Pakistan, because his regime became more intolerable, more oppressive and more corrupt without providing any material benefits to the deprived masses". To add insult to injury, a sustained and determined attempt was made to cover up these failures with the help of phony publicity." When everything failed, it was his "disagreeable lot to propose the dismantling of the constitutional structure which he had devised, and in which he had expressed so much faith, in order to give effect to institutions in which, according to himself, he had no confidence and which he considered unsuitable for Pakistan."

This is a detailed and comprehensive study of Pakistan affairs during the period 1962-69. It is, therefore, a pity that some factual errors have crept in here and there. After the Chinese attack on India, the first Indo-Pakistan meeting at a ministerial level began not in January 1963 but in December 1962, not in Delhi but in Rawalpindi. The Indian Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, did not visit Rawalpindi in February but only in December, his next visit being to Karachi in February 1963. Bhutto leading the Pakistan delegation came to Delhi in January 1963 (P. 129). No Revolutionary Council was set up in Jammu and Kashmir in August 1965, and no disturbances broke out in Srinagar (P. 142). His assertion that Ramani, the Malaysian representative in the Security Council "attacked Pakistan in terms of unpardonable violence" (P. 153) is not justified by the text of Ramani's statement or statements in the Council. This is also clear from the fact that Ramani was not recalled or replaced by his Government. At Tashkent Kosygin's "persuasions may have been reinforced by veiled threats" (P. 157). What veiled threats and against whom? This is either sheer speculation or based on hearsay.

GOOD READING FOR HIGH MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

A REVIEW ARTICLE

BRIGADIER J NAZARETH

AN officer who is professionally keen seeks to widen his knowledge by studying military campaigns. However, if this study is not preceded by the right environmental knowledge in the context of which the campaigns should be viewed, he will be mistaking the trees for the wood. He will not be in a position to derive the correct lessons from his study because he is primarily concerning himself with the sequence of events. Their causes are to be found in the wider setting, particularly in the personalities that influence them. The books of Barbara W Tuchman are a good source for obtaining such background knowledge.

In *'The Proud Tower'* she deals with the political and social strife of the Twentieth Century. *'The Guns of August'* covers the causes and events of World War I, and now her latest book *'Sand against the Wind'* is a biography of General 'Vinegar' Joe Stilwell and the American experience in China from 1911 to 1945. If the Burma Campaign of World War II is to be studied, this book gives a good insight into the strategical implications.

As a writer Barbara Tuchman is remarkable. She has the story-teller's ability of being able to sustain interest throughout. If the reader can cross the hurdle of not being intimidated by the size of her books, their very bulk will ensure him a prolonged treat. As a historian she has the ability of organising complex material in an interestingly succinct manner, and of analysing causes; as a writer she has a fluency of style and graphic description. But what makes her books reach the high watermark is her ability for profound characterisations which makes the personalities she portrays vivid and, what is more important, which show how they determine events.

MONUMENTAL WORK

'Sand against the Wind' is a monumental work which has important lessons for statesmen and officers holding responsibilities at different echelons.

Sand against the wind—Stilwell and the American experience in China 1911—45 By Barbara W. Tuchman, pp, 621, Price £ 5.95.

How are the war aims of different nations determined and how does one reconcile those of different Allies? In the Far East, Churchill had always the political end in view and wished to bypass Burma in favour of operations leading eventually to Singapore 'the only prize that will restore British prestige in the region'. The United States wanted action leading to China as a base of operations against Japan. But the vision of China as one of the four great post-war powers had no appeal to the British. Britain knew that to whatever degree she joined the United States in helping China she would be acting contrary to her own interests, while the United States knew that to whatever degree she joined Britain in helping to restore colonial rule and white supremacy would be contrary to United States policy, sentiment and future relations with Asian countries. The Chinese opinion held that not only was China justified in remaining passive after five years of resistance but it was her right to get as much as possible out of her Allies while they fought. The exercise of this right became Chiang Kai-shek's chief war effort. He was more concerned in preserving his army to maintain his position after the war, especially against the Communists, than in fighting the Japanese. General Tu told General Alexander in Burma, "The Fifth Army is our best army because it is the only one which has field guns, and I cannot afford to lose those guns. If I lose them the Fifth Army will no longer be our best".

Under these conditions the plight of General Stilwell who had to organise the resistance of the Chinese against the Japanese can well be imagined. He had to deal with a head of State who used every possible threat of making terms with the Japanese to extract the maximum equipment from the United States but was reluctant to use that equipment when given to fight.

Experts of organisations will raise their eyebrows at the limit of absurdity that was reached in the command procedures involving General Stilwell. As chief of the Chinese armies fighting in Burma, he held a temporary corps command within the South East Asia Command structure of which under another hat he was also Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, making himself his own commander. The situation was like that of the Lord Chancellor in *Iolanthe* who tangled himself as a suitor to his own ward and wondered whether he could give his consent to his own marriage, or marry without his own consent in which case could he cite himself for contempt of his own court? But apparently no one at Headquarters South East Asia Command lost any sleep over this absurdity. The Supreme wanted General Stilwell together with General Slim, commander of the 14th Army, to serve under General Sir George Giffard, the overall commander of the ground forces of South East Asia. General Stilwell refused. Putting on his hat as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, he said he was senior, and in another guise as commanding general of American forces in China, Burma and India, he said he did not have the Presidential authority

to put himself under General Giffard. The adroit way he shifted his offices was according to General Slim "a lesson in the mobile offensive defensive". Yet later, he preferred to serve under General Slim his junior whom he respected.

PARADOXICAL

Another paradoxical lesson we can learn from the book is Liddell Hart's dictum, 'We learn from history that we don't learn from history'. We see the United States support the corrupt and authoritarian regime of Chiang Kai-shek against the advice of more perceptive observers. General Stilwell felt that there was something fundamentally wrong about America having manoeuvred itself into the position of having to support this rotten regime—one that so curiously mirrored what she was fighting against in Germany, 'a one-party government supported by a Gestapo (Tai Li's organisation) and headed by an unbalanced man with little education'. With unique obtuseness we have seen the United States repeat the same type of support to similar recipients—President Thieu in South Viet Nam and General Yahya Khan in Pakistan.

A nation that enjoys material prosperity apparently finds it impossible to absorb the lesson that no amount of material support can compensate for the lack of moral fibre, and when this substitution is sought to be effected, the degradation proceeds at an accelerated pace until ruin is certain. Chiang Kai shek's regime was corrupt to the core and no amount of material transfusions by the United States could stem the spread of the malignant tumour. In contrast, the virile, but poorly equipped Red Army was able to grow from strength to strength from the nourishment provided to Chiang himself, that it captured.

The United States maintenance to China was carried over the 'Hump' route, a dangerous airway over the mountains that cost the lives of many pilots. Convinced that black markets awaited the cargo destined for the ground forces, the fliers did not want to risk their lives to fill private godowns. The Americans themselves were not slow to share in the profits of corruption. Smuggling of gold, sulphur drugs, foreign currency, gems and PX supplies was carried on by the American Air Force, Army, Red Cross and civilians for an estimated take of over S 4,000,000 by the end of 1944. Even girls were imported from other parts of China and India.

Truly, 'we learn from history that we don't learn from history'. The pattern in South Viet Nam today is identical but escalated one stage further. The American soldier cannot face the Viet Cong in personal combat and has to resort to warfare by remote control.

The young officer should find a source of inspiration in the study of the character of Stilwell, especially when he is apt to be disillusioned in seeing his elders preach devotion to duty and practise furtherance of self-interest.

TRUE SOLDIER

Stilwell was a thoroughly honest professional soldier with an extreme devotion to duty. He had an exalted concept of true soldiering and an almost impossible ideal of what a true soldier should be. He could not understand a soldier who did not place duty to the mission first. His only concern was to get the job done. When he was given a commendation for his personal leadership during the withdrawal from Burma, by the President, Secretary for War and the entire War Department, he wrote a one-word comment, "Why"? Nor could his indifference to personal honour be considered as striking a pose for the public. When he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for heroism under fire during the action at Taunggyi, he wrote in a letter to his wife, "The whole thing is bunk, pumped out of a very minor incident and entirely undeserved. It is embarrassing but luckily time moves on and such things are forgotten".

Again after his retreat from Burma, at a press conference he said, "I claim we got a hell of a beating. We got run out of Burma and it is humiliating as hell. I think we ought to find out what caused it, go back and retake it". On this *The New York Times*, in a leading editorial stated that Churchill and Roosevelt, for all their magnificent rhetoric could each learn something from General Stilwell and lesser officialdom could heed him both as to diction and as to ploy.

He could not suffer any form of ostentation associated with rank and position. Once, on the occasion of a promotion when he was asked to give a speech, he said, "The higher a monkey climbs on a pole, the more you see of his behind". When he was a four-starred general a friend once overheard him in Washington phoning for a Pullman reservation without giving his name and meekly accepting an upper berth. He disdained from using his rank even for normal privileges, and used to stand in a queue for the barber's chair.

His devotion to duty encompassed an indomitable fighting spirit. Field Marshal Slim thought him to be as obstinate as a whole team of mules, sometimes deliberately rude, but possessed of a major military virtue: he was constantly on the look-out for an aggressive counter-strike. During the retreat from Burma, before he reached Homalin, he was already discoursing on his plan for the re-conquest of Burma.

A by-product of General Stilwell's down to earth honesty was the manner in which he expressed his opinions on personalities and situations

in pungent and often irreverent epithets. Describing the lack of support for his operations, he said, "Peanut (Chiang Kai-shek) and I are on a raft with one sandwich between us and the rescue ship is heading away from the scene". The Chiang Kai-shek government was "a one-man joke, the KMT is his tool, Madame is his front, the silly US propaganda is his lever and we are his suckers".

His comments on personalities were no less barbed. Roosevelt was a "rank amateur in all military matters subject to whims, fancies and sudden childish notions". Hopkins was "a pleasant old farmer". The Allied representatives at the surrender ceremony, except Admiral Nimitz and the Chinese, were a "scratchy looking crowd". General Percival who surrendered Singapore was "the weakest sister I have ever seen even in the British Army"; the Englishman, 'a fat red dumpling'; the Australian "a tub of guts"; the Canadian "an elderly masher of the gigolo type"; the Frenchman, "rather trim with a pair of dirty-looking apaches as aides"; the Dutchman, "fat and bald"; the New Zealander, "amateur looking". "What a crew of characters in the eyes of the Japanese. The human race was poorly represented."

Abrasive and acid personalities, however conscientious and professionally competent they may be, usually get the short shrift from bureaucratic organisations like the army. How was General Stilwell not only able to survive but also reach the highest rank? In supporting General Stilwell the character of the Chief of the Army Staff, General George C Marshall, shines with intense luminosity. Senior officers have a tendency of asking for the loyalty of their subordinates. But downward loyalty is one of the strongest cementing factors in a military organisations and yet one of the most difficult to practise. It is easy for a senior commander to find a scapegoat in his subordinate for a mistake committed. It is also easy for a senior to sacrifice the career of a subordinate bureaucratic pressures and procedures. It is immensely difficult for a senior to support his subordinate, when it would be inconvenient to do so.

General Marshall had full faith in General Stilwell's professional competence and devotion to duty and he stood by him against pressures for his removal from all quarters, including Chiang Kai-shek and President Roosevelt himself. When General Marshall visited London he was told by his opposite number, Sir Alan Brooke, that General Stilwell would have to be relieved as Deputy to Lord Mountbatten because he could not get on with the three Service chiefs. His uninhibited expressions as a Limey (British) hater were added factors. General Marshall angrily flared up. He said, "Brooke, you have three C-in-Cs in India; none of them will fight. We have one man who will fight and you want to take him out. What the hell kind of business is this?"

Of this kind of stuffing are great Chiefs of Staff made.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE YOUNG STALIN

by Edward Elis Smith

(Published by Farrar, New York, 1967) Pp 470, Price \$ 8.50

MANY readers will find this book, written by a former agent of the C.I.A. who resided and travelled widely in Russia and served in American Embassy in Moscow from 1953 to 1956, a highly controversial one.

Briefly, Smith's thesis is that for many years in his younger days Stalin was an agent of Okhrana, the Tsarist Police. This conclusion is drawn from his absence from hideouts which Okhrana raided from time to time to arrest revolutionaries; from his being banned by his colleagues, Social Democrats, and his consequent expulsion from Tiflis; from no ostensible means of livelihood except for his first and only job in the Tiflis Geophysical Observatory in 1901; and from his ability to maintain his wife and child with funds which were ample not only for this purpose but also for his extensive travels in Russia and Europe. Periodically he disappeared for months and nobody knew what he did or where he went. Curiously he did not attend the proceedings of the Central Committee on 24 October, 1917, especially when it had been made clear that "no member of the Central Committee may absent himself from Smolny today without special dispensation". He never explained his absence either orally or in writing. Even when he was arrested, he was not forced to suffer any particular hardship, and on one occasion he was evidently permitted to escape.

Such was the character who, according to the author, was perhaps the most influential person of the twentieth century. Although the accusations are based on a mass of documentary evidence, it is perhaps necessary to point out that a secret service agent is generally a double agent. He may have helped Okhrana from time to time, but he may have served Lenin equally well, for all revolutions need purges. Otherwise it is difficult to explain that even though he was in opposition to Lenin during the period in question, Lenin sufficiently valued his services to place him on the first politburo of the party and make him a member of the first Bolshevik Government in much the same manner as he had allegedly coopted him into the first Bolshevik Central Committee five years earlier at the Prague Conference and ten years earlier sponsored him at the London Conference of 1907.

Elusive, secretive, disinclined to communicate with anybody in writing, he was frequently beaten mercilessly by his stocky father in childhood. But

his mother loved him and contrary to his father's wishes desired him not to become, like his father, a cobbler, but to join a theological seminary in Tiflis where Stalin did spend some time. After he became dictator of Soviet Russia, Stalin killed off the majority of the old Bolsheviks and others who had worked tirelessly for revolution and a classless society. He established a rigid two-caste system in which there were only the new caste of communist exploiters and the masses they exploited. He established a new autocracy with himself as its head that was vastly more ruthless and heartless than that of the Romanovs. He used Russian nationalistic fervour and even the Russian Orthodox Church in waging war. He created a monstrous intelligence-security-conspiratorial service that murdered and terrorized not only in Russia, but throughout the world. As the author puts it "within two decades the Okhrana had won the fight against the revolutionaries after all. There was merely a new Tsar."

—B.L.S.

APPEARANCE AND REALITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

by Grant Hugo

(Published by Chatto & Windus, London, 1970) Pp 207, Price 35 S

A VERY interesting and fascinating account of diplomats at work, a thought-provoking volume. The subject is lucidly presented and the author shows clearly the vast gulf that lies between the public utterances of statesmen/diplomats and the reality of the situations. An attempt is made to rationalise and analyse the H.M.S. Amethyst incident in Chinese waters in 1949 and the USS Pueblo affair in 1968 off the Korean coast. The insight given into the prolonged negotiations on these incidents—depending on varying relations at different times—is most educative. This is certainly most desirable reading for officers of the Services who frequently get involved with foreign diplomats in the course of their duties. The merit of the book is that even the layman can understand and enjoy it.

The author is to be complimented on his formula for prediction/analysis of international situations.

—KAY

THE NATION KILLERS

by Robert Conquest

(Published by Macmillan, London, 1970) Pp 222 Price 50 S.

PERHAPS few centuries have seen so much human blood shed as the one in which we live. The phenomenon has become so commonplace that it no longer leaves even a scar on memory. True, history has known Genghiz Khan and Timur Lane, but the population in those days was not so

large and the means of destroying human life were neither so sophisticated nor so widely available, as they have been in the twentieth century.

In World War I alone 10,000,000 died and 20 million wounded. In World War II millions died not only on the battlefields, on land or at sea but also in the numerous cities which were bombed, not to mention millions who were put to death by Hitler in gas chambers. Russia alone lost 23 million lives. Then there was the bloodbath at the time of partition in India, in Indonesia when the communists attempted a coup d'etat, in several countries of Africa, in Bangladesh and Viet Nam. Nor must one forget to mention China where the number of casualties first under the Japanese, then under the communist revolution and finally under the recent Cultural Revolution must run into God knows how many millions.

Between the two World Wars, there were countless purges in the Soviet Union. The book under review deals with one of the many tragic episodes in which thousands were uprooted to die physically or culturally. Eight entire nations—men, women and children—were deported from their homelands by Stalin. On the southern borderlands of Russia proper live a number of mainly Asian peoples, most of whom formerly occupied much larger territories. First among the deported were the Volga Germans who were brought into the territory as favoured immigrants by the Russian authorities themselves. Second were the Kalmyks, inhabiting the steppe south-west of Astrakhan, who came fairly completely under Russian influence as early as the end of the seventeenth century. And then the Mohammedan nations of the Crimea and the Caucasus.

The Volga Germans were deported in 1941 and the others in 1943-44. The two main Asian minority groups were also involved: the Muslim Turki and the Buddhist Mongol. All the Turkic and Mongol nations reached by the Germans were deported—in addition to others such as the Chechens who belonged to neither group. Nothing here matches the horror of the Nazi gas chambers. These nations were not physically annihilated. Deported with heavy casualties, their remnants scattered in distant and alien territory, their names deleted from the lists, their languages ceasing to be taught or printed, they were destined to a more gradual oblivion. The book is another memorial to man's inhumanity to man.

—BLS

THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND FOREIGN POLICY 1898-1914

by Zara S. Steiner

(Published by Cambridge University Press, London, 1969) Pp 262 Price £ 3.25

A DIPLOMAT these days, says Ustinov, is nothing but a head-waiter who's allowed to sit down occasionally. Here is a study of the British Foreign Office in one of the most crucial periods of its development, that is up to the beginning of World War I. It is based on published books, docu-

ments and papers as well as those in private possession. Mrs. Steiner obviously devoted years of labour to produce a work of enlightenment and erudition, which no student of foreign policy can afford to miss.

She has sought to show how and why the Foreign Office, in the years before 1914, assumed an integral part in the process of formulating foreign policy. There have been many studies of diplomacy. More recently, there have been studies of the administration and enactment of foreign relations. These have focused on both the constitutional and institutional aspects of the making of policy. Mrs Steiner, on the other hand, has tried to do something different. She has tried to analyse the actual work and underlying stance of those men who began as clerks, exercising influence within a narrow, often traditional bureaucratic radius, and who by the time the world War began, had won a permanent place in the conception of British Foreign Affairs. The author deals with the personalities and political interplay of the individuals involved.

Much of the book depends upon letters, minutes and memoranda written by officials in haste and without thought of publicity. "My study deals with the anatomy of decision. How are decisions made, what complex chain of intuition and reason, of ignorance and awareness, relates the initial dim intent to the final formulation? Any complete answer involves areas beyond the historian's normal terms of reference. These include psychology, sociology and, one occasionally feels, the craft of the astrologer. Even when abundantly available, documents are only stones in a complex mosaic."

Briefly she touches on such aspects of the context of foreign policy as the role of the Sovereign, the interventions of the Cabinet and Committee of Imperial Defence, the influence of Parliament, of the City, and of the Press. In the period under scrutiny, the servants of the Foreign Office had little doubt that diplomacy ought to be conducted by a professional elite in an arena well removed from the "vagaries of political amateurism and public debate." It was not Eyre Crowe alone who "rather looked down on the Secretaries of State than up to them and regarded Foreign Office clerks as the really important people". Had these remarkable *clerks* not taken so exalted a view of their mysteries, had they not gone so far in insulating themselves from the community at large, the arts of diplomacy would not have been so drastically discredited when the lights went out in Europe.

—BLS

ALLIANCES AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

by Robert E. Osgood

(Published by Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1968) Pp 171, Price \$ 6.50.

THIS is an excellent book, describing in depth and with commendable clarity the progression of American foreign policy from its isolation of the past to its present-day involvement in various alliances as an

active participant in Realpolitik...Alliances have now "lost their stigma in the American eye and gained the aura of an instrument of international order." The genesis of this new role of American foreign policy is traced to the Greek civil war, when Britain forsook its traditional sphere of influence in Greece and Turkey. America's new role was signalized by the so-called Truman Doctrine, which, under the wider interpretations given to it in the following years, led to expanding American political activity, even far away from home and its neighbouring areas. The extension of American commitments resulting from that Doctrine led to the formation of NATO. The Korean War provided further impetus to the American alliance policy and led to alliances outside Europe—in the Middle East and the Far East. The book analyses and dissects the policies implied in the NATO, CENTO, SEATO and other numerous bilateral alliances into which America entered.

The author does not limit his study to the American alliances or the alliances inspired by America, but goes on to discuss the genesis and growth of the opposing system of alliances, viz The Warsaw Treaty Organization, the Sino-Soviet Alliance.

America's experience with regionalism and military assistance agreements has been a very significant experience in international politics in the contemporary world. Its consequences are a matter of deep interest to the whole world, and would have undoubted repercussions for the future. The final chapter is devoted to a speculation on the future of these alliances, and discusses the possible trends in the international environment, the prospect of nuclear proliferation, ballistic missile defence, etc.

It is a book on a very important subject which commands the interest of the whole world today. America, by its size, strategic position and material resources, wields a great and perhaps intimate influence on most parts of the world, and it is to be seen where its reversal of traditional and historic rejection of alliances and its present resultant involvements would lead it to, and how, in turn, they would affect the fortunes of the world.

Notwithstanding its high price of \$ 6.50 compared with its size of 166 pages of text matter, the book would commend itself for its rich content and topicality to all those interested in present American political trends and their impact on the world.

—K.M.L.S.

THE THEORY OF FORCE AND ORGANISATION OF DEFENCE IN INDIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: FROM EARLIEST TIMES TO 1947

by Nagendra Singh

(Published by Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1969) Pp 290, Price Rs 45.00.

FORCE has been a necessary concomitant of any ordered society. Dr. Nagendra Singh traces its concept and application since the ancient period of Indian history and carries the story up to the

modern times. He is mainly concerned with the evolution of the military in the context of man's increasing experimentation with constitutionalism. Such a treatment is only to be expected from one who combines his knowledge of history with the discipline of the law—which is his main field. He has eminently succeeded in the task and narrated the story with clarity and consistency.

In his own words, the object of his work is "to study the evolution of those organs of the State which provide the sanction of force for the maintenance of law and order within, and secure the sovereign independence of the State from without, apart from providing the engine for conquests, expansion and consolidation of empires." The first two are universally acknowledged to be the legitimate roles of any army. The last is only a perverse use of it, though admittedly ancient Indian kings did resort to it, as aggressive wars were considered to be a sign of greatness and glory. Thus we find that most kings in ancient India made aggressive wars on their neighbours. That, however, is history. The modern concept of the application of force is different, and only maintenance of internal order and meeting aggression are considered the legitimate functions of armies the world over. Departures from this rule occur here and there, but not without hurting human conscience and violating international law.

The author proceeds from a description of the theory and application of force from ancient Indian kingdoms and republics to the organisation of defence in Rajput feudalism, to the defence set-up of the Delhi Sultanate, and the defence mechanism of the Moghul empire. He then describes the origin and development of the Indian army under the British. In a separate chapter the question of civilian control over the armed forces is discussed. The last chapter deals with Indianization of the defence forces. Throughout he has traced the constitutional connection of the military mechanism with the political structure. For example, in ancient India the king was the source and fountain of all power—political and military. He was so veritably. In modern India, the theory is maintained, but in effect there is a great deal of decentralization of power; and the allocation of functions also differs.

This is an interesting account of the development of defence mechanism in India, and no scholar, especially of history and political science, can afford to miss it. Even the general reader would find it full of interesting material put across most intelligibly.

—KMLS

WAR AND PEACE IN SOUTH EAST ASIA

by Peter Lyen

(Published by Oxford University Press, 1969) Pp 244, Price 15 s.

THE book starts off with a chapter on "South-East Asia enters world politics." In the next chapter it discusses the three former international orders, viz (1) China, S-E Asia, and the tribute system, (2) The European

colonial order, and (3) Japan's 'new order' in S-E Asia. The third chapter gives an outline history and contemporary politics of each of the S-E Asian States, viz. Thailand, the Philippines, Burma, Indonesia, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia and Singapore. The fourth chapter describes the interests and involvement of outside Powers, such as the United States, Britain, France, India, Japan, China, the Soviet Union, etc. The fifth chapter discusses the alliances and alignments in this region. It then proceeds to bring out in the sixth chapter the distinction between neutralism and non-alignment, and discusses the fate of neutralization of Laos, and how unlike its European counterpart in Switzerland, it became the casualty of Big-Power politics. The seventh chapter, which is entitled Welfare and Warfare, deals with insurgency and confrontation and discusses how the Vietnam war is a new type of war. In the eight and the final chapter are discussed the prospects of peace through Great Power policies, economic betterment, orderly government, etc.

The colonial rule of the French, Dutch and the British left a vacuum filled temporarily by Japan. The ouster of the latter, and subsequent independence of the SE Asian countries brought in its wake new and unforeseen problems. The assertion of Communism for pre-eminence and other factors gave rise to armed confrontations, and in course of time became a testing ground for the lethiferousness of new weapons. The Vietnam war has already assumed major extra-regional significance. It is nevertheless doubtful if the destructiveness of the weapons used produces proportionate political results.

The overall scene in SE Asia in recent years has been the challenge of China to Pax Americana. The biggest enigma about the future of SE Asia is whether Pax Americana is destined to be succeeded by a Pax Sinica. This is an open question, and as the author points out "the indications are that it is not going to be settled oneway or another in the next decade, or perhaps in the remaining years of the century."

It is perhaps the only book of its kind and excels in simplicity and logic of treatment. The South-East Asian question is the burning theme of contemporary international politics, and the Big-Power involvement has lent it a peculiar dimension.

The book provides absorbing reading and is extremely informative. It is recommended for purchase not only by libraries and institutions but also individual readers interested in pursuing the course of modern politics. The book is well written and treats every aspect of the subject in a lucid manner.

—K.M.L.S.

NEPAL STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL

by Leo E. Rose

(Published by Oxford University Press, 1971) Pp 310, Price Rs 45-00.

THIS book is the history of Nepal during the past two centuries, and refers in particular to the relations of that landlocked country with India, China, Russia and the United Kingdom. In its long chequered career, the Kingdom of Nepal came into armed conflict with China (1791-93), and the British in India during 1814-16. The latter undermined Chinese influence in Nepal and also led in a measure to instability in Tibet. The consequent reorientation of foreign policy is discussed in the fifth chapter. The momentous events in India in 1857, exploding into an anti-British movement in northern India, were made use of by Nepal in adjusting itself to the British "Forward Policy". But Nepal continued to be pressured by Pax Britannica. This is evidenced by the fact that Curzon visited Kathmandu to get the Nepalese Government to allow a party "to attack Mount Everest." Nepal's predicament was exacerbated when the Russian-British rivalry over Tibet began to assume serious proportions in the early twentieth century. There was a revolution in Nepalese politics in 1945-54, and this is treated at length in the eight chapter. This chapter, among other things, traces the fluctuations in the India-Nepal relations: how from friendly relations the sentiments in Nepal gradually turned anti-Indian.

The ninth chapter discusses New Directors in Foreign Policy during the years 1955-60, that is from the accession of King Mahendra till 1961 when a whole new series of factors intruded. These are dealt within the subsequent chapters. The next chapter, entitled The Crisis with New Delhi, 1961-62, deals with the coup, Peking's reaction to it, Pakistan's entrance into the picture, closer ties with China, and the impact of the Sino-Indian border war.

The traumatic events of 1962 did lead to realization in Nepal that "relations with India could not be allowed to continue in a state of semi-crisis without adversely affecting the security and integrity of both countries." The consequent balancing of Nepalese politics between New Delhi and Peking is dealt with in the eleven chapter. The last, the twelfth chapter, brings the theme to a close by giving "A Perspective on Nepal's Foreign Policy."

The above enumeration of chapters reveals that the history and foreign policy of Nepal have been comprehensively dealt with by the author. The style is absorbing. The subject has been treated of with thoroughness, clarity and consistency. A book not to be missed.

—K.M.L.S.

SOUTHEAST ASIA TODAY AND TOMORROW

By Richard Butwell

(Published by Pall Mall, London, 1959) PP 245, Price £ 3.00

IN this second revised edition, the author has re-examined the political events of South-East Asia in the post-World War II period, and has also tried to peep into the future by an assessment and analysis of the internal and external forces in contemporary South-East Asia.

The treatment in this book is different from that adopted in another book on the same subject reviewed here. The first chapter traces the history of the region before World War II. The second chapter deals with events in the separate States of the region during the period 1945-60. This is followed by a separate chapter on Vietnam and enumerates stages in the escalation of war in the 1960's. The fourth chapter goes back to the SE Asian nations, other than Vietnam and picks up the thread of development from 1960 onwards. Then, again, the fifth chapter deals with the impact of Vietnam on the neighbouring countries. This treatment breaks the continuity of reading of an otherwise very illuminating material painstakingly compiled. In spite of this difficulty, the book is rich in content, and must be read by all those interested in present-day political developments.

The sixth chapter, entitled Dynamics of Political Change brings out the major changes in SE Asia as a whole, viz. the growing popularization of politics, the rapidly changing composition of ruling elites, the decline of the Communists, the growing gap between the old leadership and the emergent new generation and the increasing irrelevance of imported packaged ideologies.

The seventh chapter—Unsolved Problems: Domestic and Foreign—treats of the interrelatedness of domestic and external problems, throwing up experiments in institutionalized regional cooperation in the shape of ASEAN, ECAFE, ASPAC, etc.

In the next chapter—After Vietnam—the author probes into the possibilities in the 1970's and reaches the conclusion that though "Outsiders will not play a smaller role than they have done in the past, but indigenous leaders will play a greater role, as part of the continuing process of decolonization of the area."

In the final chapter, the ninth, the author examines the whole problem in perspective, and points out the misconceptions and misjudgements that led the USA to mistakes. The United States was concerned with containment of Communism. But its domino theory "lacked insight and perspective."

The book is a valuable contribution to political literature on South-East Asia. Written by a Professor of Southeast Asian Politics in the USA,

it bears the imprint of deep scholarship. It is useful for all students of political science, and is no less valuable as general reading matter for the intelligentsia interested in important developments in the world today.

The book also has a useful select bibliography and an index, and an Appendix "Southeast Asia at a Glance", which add to its value.

K.M.L.S.

AMBASSADOR'S JOURNAL

by John Kenneth Galbraith

(Published by Hamish and Hamilton, London 1969) Pp 656, Price 84 s.

OF all the American Ambassadors to India, Galbraith has been the wittiest, apart from being an eminent economist. He has a capacity for deflating others, but what is of greater importance, he can also laugh at himself. The result—an exceedingly readable and enjoyable book. Flattery was not, and has not been, Galbraith's weakness.

Galbraith arrived in India when the Kennedy years had begun and when the Nehru era was drawing to a close. Gifted with a keen eye and an ungrudging candour, he soon had many things to say on many developments. He hated committees and some of his most amusing sallies are against the State Department. To give an example. "In the State Department the multitude must all make policy. When I was back this time one of my assistant Secretary friends attended the Secretary's staff meeting from nine-fifteen till ten. Then he had a meeting with the Under-secretary on operations until ten-thirty. Then he took until eleven-thirty to inform his staff of what went on at the earlier meetings. Whereupon they adjourned to pass on the news to their staffs. This is, I am told, communication." Or again: "The State Department, to a remarkable degree, is the sum of less than its parts". Similar views are found scattered throughout the journal. The masterpiece is given on page 187. "If the State Department drives you crazy you might calm yourself by contemplating its effect on me. The other night, I woke up with a blissful feeling and discovered I had been dreaming that the whole Goddam place had burned down. I dozed off again hoping for a headline saying no survivors". This he wrote, if you please, in a letter to the President who from time to time took pleasure in announcing that Galbraith was the best Ambassador he had.

Protocol activities in New Delhi are "disguised unemployment". A Conference never raises a decision to the highest level of intelligence. "It is far more likely to lower it to the lowest common denominator of caution."

His comments on some American policies are shrewd and penetrating. "The greatest difficulty with Dulles", he writes, "was his yearning for new and exciting variants in policy—massive retaliation, the thumbd nose at neutrals,

military alliances with the indigent, change for the sake of change." He was critical of American military aid to Pakistan, and for a very sound reason. At a spirited debate at American Ambassadors' meeting in New Delhi, Galbraith indicated his own attitude. "I pointed out that the pacts identified us with the governments in question. The legitimate anti-government agitation became anti-American agitation and to some extent pro-Soviet activity. Also, we cannot use military aid as leverage for reform; military men do not exercise much reformist leverage. Also, military aid to Pakistan opens the way to pro-Soviet pressure on the Indians."

—BLS

INDIA'S STATIC POWER STRUCTURE

by J. D. Sethi

(Published by Vikas Publications, Delhi, 1969) Pp 212 Price Rs 25

Dr. J.D. Sethi's study incorporates number of articles which were written at a time when the Indian democratic system was at the cross-roads. After the death of a charismatic personality like Nehru, a number of cracks were noticed within the Congress Party, which became very much distinct during the Fourth General Elections.

The Syndicate comprising personalities such as Morarji Desai, Atulya Ghose, Kamaraj and Patil, virtually monopolised the power structure within the Congress Party. The crisis of Indian politics, as the author thinks, is the crisis of static power structure resisting the pulls and pressures of dynamic macropolitical and economic forces in the country (preface, VIII). Throughout the first part of his book, he ventures to justify as to how the power structure in India remains more or less unchanged. The static power structure, according to him, connotes the replacement of one set of elites by another without fundamentally changing any of the existing balances. As an economist turned political commentator, he assesses the economic policy of the Government of India and points out the various loopholes. He, however, feels that the Congress Party, which was 'a consensus of political stagnation' in the Nehru era (pp. 44), cannot bring any substantive good to the country, unless it evolves 'a double consensus among leaders on policies and division of power' (pp. 62).

In the second part, the author focuses his observation to the various infrastructures upon which the very fabric of our political system has depended. The practice of defection and coalition politics, according to him, has only resulted in tarnishing the image of the country. Dr. Sethi also argues that the extravagance in election expenditure and various other ugly practices by political parties during the polls threaten to make our system 'dysfunctional.'

If we have a close look at the working of our political system, the interaction between various groups and factions within the political parties do

bring in some amount of control, making, contrary to Dr. Sethi's observation, our policy functional to some extent.

Populism, in the eye of the author, destroys the very essence of democracy and results in 'economic immobilism'. But he does not highlight as to how populism can be transformed into popular participation. Nevertheless many of his observations on the socio-economic problems faced by India, merit attention. Eventhough some of his prophecies regarding the emerging trends in Indian politics did not come true, Dr. Sethi's book is a provocative diagnosis of the working of the Indian political system since independence.

—P.K.M.

THEIR FINEST HOUR : SAGA OF INDIA'S DECEMBER VICTORY

by G.S. Bhargava

(Published by Vikas, Delhi, 1972) PP 168 Price Rs 20

THE book talks about 26 odd gallantry award winners of the 1971 war. The author, Mr. G.S. Bhargava, who is on the editorial staff of The Hindustan Times, is well known for his versatility and needs no introduction.

The title of the book is attractive and catchy. The author could not have done better than to hit upon the Churchillian phrase—"THEIR FINEST HOUR". It no doubt is an appropriate and befitting title.

The book contains accounts of the heroes of all the three Services and the Border Security Force. They are 14 from the Army; seven from the Navy; four from the Air Force and one from the Border Security Force.

Maps and photographs are an asset in any publication, if judiciously used, as these make the matter easier and interesting for the reader. The author has used both very well. The maps however could have been made more useful by indicating some additional relevant place names.

The author has rightly taken both, Lord Roberts of Kandhar, the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army (1885-1893) and Field Marshal Montgomery to task for their theories and prejudices—the former for his pet theory of 'Martial Races' and the latter for his serious prejudice regarding the capability of Indians in deployment of armour. According to him infantry was the only branch in which Indians reached European standards.

The author is fortunate in having had the unstinted support of the entire Directorate of Public Relations of the Defence Ministry, as acknowledged in the preface.

The statement at page 100 of the book (reproduced below), from a well-informed journalist like Mr Bhargava comes as a surprise:

"For the first time since independence the Indian Air Force had an opportunity in the December 1971 war to play a crucial combat role. In 1971, both speed and edge in weaponry were on the Indian side."

The Indian Air Force had a similar opportunity in 1965 as well. Unlike the Navy, no constraints whatsoever were put on the Air Force. It had full freedom of action. As such, the 1971 opportunity cannot be termed as the first of its type as made out by the author. Similarly the alleged edge in speed too is neither very correct nor convincing. The Mirages Pakistan had against our SU-7s and Migs have better speed and endurance.

It is rather the super-skill of our pilots in the use of their aircraft like the Army personnel's skill in the use of their Centurians and Vijayanta tanks against the enemy's far superior Patton tanks, that gave the edge over the enemy.

The production and get-up of the book is good and the outer cover is particularly attractive. Vikas Publishing House would deserve all credit for such a nice production but for the numerous errors in printing which are least expected of publishers of their standing and repute.

The book makes interesting reading and deserves to be on the shelves of every library.

—M.S.

1971 WAR IN PICTURES

(Published by Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, India, 1972) Price Rs. 17.00

THIS colourful publication tells the story of the genocide in Eastern Bengal, now known as Bangladesh, the Indo-Pak War of December 1971, and the aftermath through pictures, which have been descriptively captioned. The brief 'Introduction' and the 'Diary of Events' at the end are the only write-ups contained in this booklet, which is in fact a pictorial album.

The "Introduction" is too brief to give any idea about the genesis of the war, and the 'Diary of Events' has recorded only some events that took place during December 3-17, 1971. The sequence of events, which sowed the seeds of war, could also have found a place either in the 'introduction' or in the 'diary of events'. Although most of the pictures are good specimens of photographic art, some of them, e.g. the pictures captioned as "Indian Officers outside a government office in Burichang", "The post office of Sehjra", etc. will not make any impression on the viewers. One or two photographs like the one captioned 'Brig. Md. Hayat of 107 Brigade of Pakistan Army in Bangladesh surrendering his belt and revolver to Maj.-Gen. Dalbir Singh, G.O.C. of an Infantry Division, at Khulna" are far from clear. Moreover, with a bit more careful editing a Chafee tank would not have been

turned into "Shafee," and bad printing like "bridg damaged" could have been avoided.

The get-up of the volume is nice, and on the whole this publication will be welcome in India and abroad. Nevertheless, with some more action-pictures and a bit more imaginative arrangement, this pictorial volume could have made a greater impact on the readers and viewers.

—B.C.

HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

by B.H. Liddell Hart

(Published by Cassell, London, 1970) Pp 768 Price 105 s.

SERIOUS students of Military History have eagerly awaited the book 'History of the Second World War' which Sir Liddel Hart had been working on ever since the end of the war. He has brought it out after almost a quarter of a century of intensive research, garnished with his fabulous military knowledge and analysis, having taken into account the views and the writings of Commanders of all the belligerent countries.

Most military history books are written far too close to the events that occurred to enable the writer to carry out an unprejudiced and dispassionate analysis of the events. It is because of this that new treatise by one of the acknowledged military thinkers of this age, will prove to be an excellent reference volume for all serious students of the art of war. The book is divided into eight comprehensive chapters that cover in analytical detail the grand strategy, the theatre strategy and most of the tactical decisions right from the precipitation of World War II, with the overrunning of Poland and the Finnish war. The sequence of the German war machine overrunning the West and magnificent advance in the Battle of Britain throws new light on this aspect of the war. The classic battles fought in North African deserts with Rommel's Panzer victories, illustrated throughout by simple yet comprehensive maps, have no equal in previous narrations by historians who have covered these issues so far.

The tide turning in the Pacific, and the battle for the Atlantic, have been brought into clear perspective as also the swift German successes in Russia and the final grand stand in defence made by the Russians.

The conquest of Europe, deliberations of France and Russia and the old and well-planned counter-stroke of Hitler in the Ardennes counter-attack make a fitting last chapter to this brilliant history of World War II that will serve as perhaps the most authoritative reference book on the subject of the last major conflict of major nations.

—K.G.

PERCIVAL AND THE TRAGEDY OF SINGAPORE

by John Smyth

(Published by Macdonald, London, 1971) Pp 298, Price £ 3.00

PERCIVAL and the Tragedy of Singapore" by Sir John Smyth, V.C. is the biography of General A.E. Percival, C-in-C, Malaysia, before the fall of Singapore by a friend and an admirer; it also happens to be an apologia for Percival because of his being the first British General who surrendered the largest number of allied troops at Singapore.

The book is very feelingly written and gives a fair idea of the strains that this officer underwent as a prisoner of war and the author regrets why it was, that unlike the American General Wain Wright who surrendered in the Philippines to the Japanese, Percival was never reinstated in the Army at the end of the war. When Winston Churchill had described the fall of Singapore in 1942 as "the worst disaster and the largest capitulation in British history." it is unfair to expect that the British Government would rehabilitate an officer who would be a living monument of the failure of British arms. It is generally known that Percival was a very competent and capable soldier. The fact that his career ended on such a low note can only be described as the fortunes of war. Because, as any student of military history knows, it is not always the brilliant general who always wins battles but the general whom Dame Fortune favours. That is why Napoleon always used to enquire when promoting or appointing Generals whether they were lucky or not. General Percival's real misfortune was that he had the bad luck of being appointed in command of Singapore in 1941.

A perusal of this book is to recapitulate the total failure of the British High Command's strategic planning in the 1930s in the preparation and preparedness of the so-called Far Eastern bastion of British Imperial Defence.

—KAY

THE BATTLE FOR GERMANY

by H Essame

(Published by B.T. Batsford 1969) Pp 228, Price 45 s.

MAJ-GEN H ESSAME has followed up his joint studies of the 'North-West Europe Campaign' with a detailed and brilliant study of the Battle for Germany, in which the German Army proved its mettle as a brilliant and determined fighting force which in spite of the vast logistical support being poured into the European mainland from America and the powerful convergent armies of the Allies could fight back and prolong the war from Sept 1944 on to May 1945.

This particular history has an authentic ring to it because the author commanded an infantry brigade in the campaigns from Normandie to the

Baltic. After a long and distinguished career, which he started as an infantry subaltern in World War I, the author has succeeded in filling the bones of historical facts with detailed studies of the personalities of the great military commanders, both on the German and Allied side. Masterly portraits of Montgomery, Eisenhower, Patton and Hitler have been drawn up after obviously detailed research in events at which the author partly participated.

Another aspect of this book, which is rarely found in histories of this nature, is the sentiments of the common soldier and the steps taken to improve his morale, in spite of extremely adverse fighting conditions, when military thrusts progressed at an extremely rapid rate, very often outstripping logistical support as in the case of Patton's advancing armies.

To those interested in a study of the final phases of the North-West Europe Campaign this book, written by a professional soldier and thoroughly researched would prove of great value.

—K.G.

THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

by James A Donovan

(Published by Frederick A Praeger, New York, 1967) Pp 246, Price \$ 5.95

THE United States Marine Corps' by Col. James A. Donovan Jr. USMC (Retd.) is an official US Government publication giving an interesting and up-to-date account of the U.S. Marines, which is one of the most colourful formations, with a magnificent esprit de corps. It gives the organisation and structure of this body and also how it keeps itself up to date, and evolves a forward-looking combat doctrine! More than once moves have been made to disband this corps and merge the parts into the army and navy, but this has been steadily resisted.

Popularly known as leather necks, they have traditions which go back to their very foundations in 1798. The British Royal Marines, formed in 1740, are the ones with whom they have a standing rivalry/camaraderie. This Corps has fought in all the major and minor campaigns in which the American armed forces were involved, on the Western front in World War I, in Europe and the Pacific Campaigns in World War II, a Corps of which any country can well be proud. It is rather a thought-provoking process to realise that the American defence experts say that in decades to come projecting of defence forces by sea will become more and more important. Yet in this great country no one has apparently thought about the creation of a seaborne army corps.

—KAY

THE DEFENDERS: A HISTORY OF THE BRITISH VOLUNTEER

by Geoffrey Cousins

(Published by Frederick Muller, London, 1968) Pp 223, Price 35 s.

THIS book is about the development over the years of what are termed the voluntary forces as opposed to regular standing armies of the United Kingdom. The author has given in a most exciting and readable form the historical development of Britain arming itself through the course of her last hundreds of years of her history for defence of the homeland and operations overseas as and when danger threatened. Factually speaking the maintenance of a huge standing army is economically a heavy burden, and emotionally not acceptable to a democratic government. Hence the English have avoided this situation on both counts! So when the armies expanded for wars, etc., it was cut down on conclusion of a peace treaty. Even after their experiences in World War I, in the late thirties, their standing army was minute compared to their continental neighbours. Yet their mobilisation in 1938 was carried out very smoothly and the field strength almost doubled which says a lot for their earlier planning and preparation. Because it goes without saying that in modern times the cost of a standing army is an enormous burden on the public exchequer, and no country can afford to maintain in peace time an army which wartime needs demand, and so some kind of second or third line defence preparedness is essential.

This book proves that over the ages Britain has learnt to apply these principles of sudden expansion in emergency of her peace-time defence forces, so that today she has an efficient machine for fielding her second and third lines of defence smoothly and swiftly. It is said that in Switzerland there is no standing army as such but in the event of an emergency 80% of the fighting population will be at their war stations fully equipped and ready with their arsenals, air fields and gadgetry in almost five days. It should be an essential exercise for the Indian Defence Forces to practice their mobilisation schedule. The book is well worth reading by all persons who are concerned or interested in the defence of their country. The author himself was a member of the so-called voluntary forces of the United Kingdom in World War II and he has done a tremendous amount of research in the preparation of this book and is to be complimented not only for his labours but more so in making it so very readable and informative. The book is certainly a must for all Service libraries.

—KAY

THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY HISTORY

by R. E. Dupuy and T. N. Dupuy.

(Published by Macdonald, London, 1970) Pp 1406 Price £ 8.50.

THIS book in its massive size reviews the history of the military events of the world from the beginning of recorded time to the present.

The authors have not only chronicaled all the facts of the world's

history, but also prefaced sections divided into well-marked periods by a commentary on the development of the military science and warfare in different periods of history. This is a gigantic effort and the world of learning will ever remain indebted to the authors for this marvellous product of their labour. They have eminently succeeded in presenting the whole spectrum of the world's military history in an orderly, readable form.

There can be no two opinions about the value of the book to the scholar as well as the reader. For its size it is fairly priced, even so, it is out of the reach of the common man. But no library worth the name can do without it.

—KMLS

STORY OF THE OLYMPICS

by Melville deMellow

(Published by National Book Trust, New Delhi, 1972) Pp 155 Price Rs. 9.50.

“**A** GOOD BOOK”, says Milton, “is the precious lifeblood of a master spirit.” As such it invariably has a chastening and exhilarating effect on the mind, being the very essence of life-long experience and the quintessence of wisdom. To such aristocratic heights of intellect one finds transported in a trice, jostling with the very masters as one thumbs through Melville de Mellow's book “Story of the Olympics.”


To Plato education was but a process of remainder—so is sports to deMellow. Though ostensibly it is a new path to him, deMellow shows a remarkable familiarity with the scene and his tread has the marked assuredness of the beaten track in narrating a story that is both illuminating and gripping. Anyone who has lent his ear to All India Radio must have marvelled at the rich resonance of voice and the cadence of prose which allied to his gifts of narration were not unoften a source of envy, nay despair, to many.

The book is indeed a veritable kaleidoscope, presenting “a dazzling spectacle” of a “steady river of colour”; a tilt gives a fleeting glimpse of Hercules, Herodotus the historian, Pindar the poet, Phidias the sculptor, the cool courage of Pherenice, defying the obnoxious edict against feminine presence in witnessing her son Pisidores pulling his punches hard in the ring; Arrachion's “leg lock” which was a virtual death-lock to the opponent and the comic spectacle of Milo of Croton, licking the platter clean after he had consumed a complete bull. Nor is the sacred vale of olympia, in the month of Hieromonion, when man cried a halt to the senseless pastime of fratricide and instead vied for the glory of manhood in the glad season of youth, neglected. On the magic carpet of words, deMellow “pilots” us, winging from the distant era of song and drama, to the momentous and memorable Munich!

Strangely, the publishers' calculations have been "upset". They timed the release of the book, with the opening of the Olympics at Munich, making it essentially, a book of the hour, but deMellow has vested it all with the authority of a book of all time, for any lover of sports.

—KVGR

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SECRETARY'S NOTES

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION

I would like to thank all those members who paid their subscription so promptly at the beginning of the year. To those of you who have not yet paid, may I remind you that your subscription was due on the 1st January. Would you please, therefore, put a cheque in the post to me TODAY.

CHANGES OF ADDRESS

Several cases of nonreceipt of Journals have been reported due to members not informing the Secretary of their changes of address. Members are requested to inform this office promptly whenever there is a change of address.

ARTICLES FOR THE JOURNAL

Articles on matters of military, naval and air force interest are welcomed. They should not exceed 5,000 words in length and preferably should run to 3,000. Contributions should be typewritten and double spaced. Your attention is drawn to Paras 8 and 9 of Army Order 274/60 regarding: Contribution may, if the author desires, appear under a pseudonym; in such cases, the name of the author remains strictly confidential. The right to omit or amend any part of an article is reserved by the editor.

From 1st October 1971 to 31st Dec 1972 the following new members joined the Institution:

BHALLA, CAPT V.K.
BRAR, MAJ T.S.
CHADDHA, LT S.N.
CHOUDHARY, FLT LT S.P.S.
DATTA, MAJ A.
GHOSH, SQN LDR C.R.
GURTAJ, 2/LT SINGH
KAPUR, SQN LDR N.K.
KULWANT, CAPT SINGH
MALHOTRA, CAPT N. K.

MENON, LCDR K. R.
PARANJAPÉ, SQN LDR S. M.
POTTY, MAJ U. K. E.
PROUDFOOT, COL C. L.
RAHEJA, SQN LDR N. N.
SEHGAL, SQN LDR S. L.
SHAHI, 2/LT R
SHARMA, MAJ RAMDAS
SHEKDAR, SQN LDR A. G.
SINGH, SQN LDR C. B.

Ten Officers messes and institutions were enrolled as subscriber members during this period.

ADDITIONS TO THE USI LIBRARY

<i>Book No.</i>	<i>Author</i>	<i>Title</i>
ECONOMICS		
330	Galbraith, John Kenneth	A Contemporary Guide to Economics, Peace and Laughter 1971.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS		
327	Das, Tapan	Sino-Pak Collusion and U.S. Policy 1972.
327	Naik, J.A.	India, Russia, China and Bangla Desh 1972.
327.56	Bose, Tarun Chandra	The Superpowers and the Middle East 1972.
327.59	Zafar Imam	World Powers in South and South-East Asia 1972.
LANGUAGE		
423	India News Service Division All India Radio	A.I.R. Lexicon 1970.
MILITARY SCIENCE		
355.05	Moulton, J.L. ed.	Brassey's Annual 1965, 1966, 1967 and 1970.
355.05	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute	Sipri year book of World Armaments and Disarmament 1970.
355.134		Badges and Emblems of the British Forces, 1940, 1968.
355.134	Gaylor, John	Military Badge Collecting 1971.
355.134	Norman, C.B.	Battle Honours of the British Army 1971.
355.14	Army Museum Ogilby Trust, Comp	Index to British Military Costume Prints 1500-1914. 1972.
355.310954	Palit, D.K.	Jammu and Kashmir Arms; History of the J & K Rifles 1972.
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
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